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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner 
and Cross-Respondent 
V . 
LOUIE EDWIN SIMS, 
Defendant-Respondent 
and Cross-Petitioner 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
AND CROSS PETITIONER 
Case No. 910218 
Court of Appeals No. 870276 
Category No. 13 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before this court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals to review certain aspects of its decision in State v. Sims. 808 P.2d 141 (Utah 
ADD.) , cert, granted. _ P - 2 d _ (Utah, 1993). This court has jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2-3(a) (1953 as amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This case originated as an appeal of right to the Utah Court of Appeals from a 
final judgement of conviction for the offense of Possession of Controlled Substance 
with Intent to Distribute entered in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Juab 
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County, the Honorable George E. Ballif, judge presiding. The Utah Court of Appeals 
reversed the judgement and conviction and ordered a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
The following issues, raised by petitioner, were granted review by this court: 
1. Did the Court of Appeals correctly conclude that the roadblock stop of 
respondent violated Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, as it was not 
authorized by statute? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals correctly conclude that the voluntary consent 
to the search of respondent's vehicle was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal 
roadblock stop? 
The following issue was raised in the cross petition for certiorari as granted by 
this court: 
Does Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution permit law enforcement 
officers to make a seizure without an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
All issues accepted for review by this court in this case involve questions of 
law. The court reviews such questions for correctness, State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 
1256 (Utah 1993). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah: 
The rights of the people to be secure in their 
persons,houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The respondent was charged by information with the offense of Possession of 
a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a violation of Utah Code Annotated 
§58-37-8(1 )(a)(i) (1953 as amended). (R.7). Prior to trial, respondent made a motion 
to suppress the evidence. He alleged that evidence was seized in violation of Article 
I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Both prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. (R. 11 , 22-57). That 
motion was denied after an evidentiary hearing. (R. 104-112 Tr. 1-67). Respondent 
requested that the trial court reconsider its ruling as that court had not specifically 
addressed the issues raised in relating to the Utah Constitution. (R. 113) That motion 
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was also denied. (R. 121-122). Respondent waived his right to trial by jury and the 
case was tried to the court based upon stipulated facts. Those facts included the 
evidence admitted at the hearing on the motion to suppress hearing. (R. 116-117). 
Respondent was convicted as charged in the information. The indeterminate prison 
sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on probation. (R. 148). 
In the Court of Appeals, the state did not brief the roadblock issue. Originally, 
the state's only argument in that court was that any illegality in the roadblock was 
vitiated by respondent's voluntary consent. In its supplemental brief, the state took 
the position that the case ought to be remanded to the trial court in light of the rulings 
in State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah, 1990), (regarding attenuation of a voluntary 
consent) and Michigan Department of Public Safety v. Sitz. 496 U.S. 444 (1990), 
(regarding the fourth amendment standards for a roadblock). The Court of Appeals 
rejected the state's request and ruled that the roadblock violated the fourth 
amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. That court also found 
that there was insufficient attenuation between the roadblock stop and the voluntary 
consent. Consequently, the evidence seized subsequent to the consent was ordered 
to be suppressed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On Wednesday, July 27, 1988, Utah Highway Patrol Troopers and deputy 
sheriffs from Utah and Juab County conducted a roadblock on Interstate 15 in Juab 
County. (Tr. 6, 48) The roadblock had multiple purposes. It was conducted to 
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detect criminal, motor vehicle registration, equipment and driver's license violations. 
(Tr. 6, 24, 50). The roadblock was located between mile posts 220 and 222 on 
Interstate 15, about 2 miles south of Nephi, Utah. (Tr. 6, 20). It was conducted 
under the supervision of Sergeant Paul Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol. (Tr. 
46-48). Sergeant Mangelson had received verbal permission to conduct the roadblock 
from his immediate superior Lieutenant James Utley. No evidence was introduced by 
the State to indicate any reason for the selection of that particular time, date or 
location. 
Notice that this roadblock would be conducted was announced in the "Juab 
County Times News." That was published about two to four weeks prior to July 27, 
1988. (Tr. 7. 33). A patrolman assigned to the roadblock testified that he was 
unsure if that particular newspaper was distributed outside of Juab County. (Tr. 34) 
Interstate 15 is the primary north-south highway in Utah and is also the primary route 
of motor vehicle travel from Salt Lake City to Los Angeles, California. (Tr. 34) There 
was no indication that the "Juab County Times News" would be available to the 
majority of the people who would be the subjects of the roadblock. 
Motorists driving on the interstate were given notice of the roadblock by three 
signs. (Tr. 7, 49, 56-57). Those signs were about four feet square, orange in color 
with black lettering. (Tr. 49) The first sign was placed within one-half mile of the 
roadblock (Tr. 56) and pictured a silhouette of a flagmen. (Tr. 49. 56) The second 
sign was about two hundred yards from the roadblock (Tr. 56) and read "Prepare to 
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Stop" Tr. 49, 57). The last sign was right at the roadblock (Tr. 56) and read "All 
Vehicles Must Stop." (Tr. 49-57) Sergeant Mangelson testified that all of these signs 
were similar to signs used at road construction zones (Tr. 55). None of the signs 
indicated that motorists were to be detained by law enforcement agents at a 
roadblock. (Tr. 56) The speed limit in this areas is posted at 65 miles per hour. (Tr. 
21) A motorist travelling at or around the speed limit would be given less than one-
half minute of notice before being stopped and detained. 
After the third sign, cones were set in the roadway directing the traffic to the 
right. (Tr. 49) About ten officers were in position to receive the vehicles. (Tr 49) 
Sergeant Mangelson gave verbal instructions to each of the officers as they arrived. 
(Tr. 22, 57) Mangelson testified that he had never received any written memorandum 
or policies for conducting roadblocks from either the Utah Highway Patrol or the State 
Department of Public Safety. (Tr. 61-62) In describing the only instructions he 
received, Sergeant Mangelson testified "I was told the signs met the regulation." (Tr. 
62) No regulation was ever introduced into evidence. 
Sergeant Mangelson also testified that he instructed the officers manning the 
roadblock that they were to look for driver's license, liquor and drug violations. (Tr. 
58) He also told them not to stop any large trucks. (Tr. 58). Initially, the officers 
were to inspect drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations. If the officers noticed 
anything that they may consider to be unusual they had the discretion to have the 
driver pull over so that further investigation could be conducted. (Tr. 58-59) Trooper 
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Carl Howard, who worked at this roadblock testified that if he noticed a problem while 
inspecting the registration and driver's license it was within his discretion to determine 
if a motorist should be further detained or allowed to leave. (Tr. 28) The trooper also 
indicated it was within his discretion to determine what investigative procedures could 
be taken. (Tr. 28) Officers had the discretion to interview the motorists, radio the 
dispatcher to run a warrants or stolen vehicle check, or request to search the vehicle 
(Tr. 25-30). 
At about 9:00 a.m. on July 27, 1988, respondent was stopped at the 
roadblock. (Tr. 8) Other than the roadblock, the troopers had no articulable suspicion 
or probable cause that respondent was involved in the commission of any crime. (Tr. 
31-32) Trooper Howard initially contacted respondent and requested to inspect his 
driver's license and registration. (Tr. 9) Respondent produced a Georgia State 
driver's license and vehicle registration that indicated he resided in Utah. (Tr. 9) At 
the time, trooper Howard detected an odor of alcohol inside the vehicle and on 
respondent's breath. (Tr. 9) Trooper Howard also noticed an open bottle of liquor on 
the rear seat. (Tr. 9) The trooper asked respondent about the odor of alcohol and 
respondent indicated that he had not been drinking that morning, but had been 
drinking the previous night. (Tr. 10) Trooper Howard requested that the respondent 
and the passenger, Dorsey Thompson, exit the vehicle. (Tr. 11) They complied with 
this request. The trooper then requested permission to search the vehicle and 
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respondent acquiesced. (Tr. 11) Trooper Howard searched the driver's side of the 
vehicle and Mangelson searched the passenger side. (Tr. 11-12, 51) 
During the search of the ashtray located in the rear passenger side door of the 
vehicle, Mangelson discovered remants of marijuana cigarettes. (Tr. 13, 39, 51) 
Trooper Howard then instructed respondent to open the trunk of the vehicle and 
respondent complied. (Tr,. 13) Numerous items were removed. A briefcase and 
suitcase were opened and searched. Relatively small bags of marijuana were located 
in those containers. (Tr. 14, 53) Trooper Howard had previously requested that 
respondent perform field sobriety tests. Those tests were conducted as Mangelson 
searched the trunk of respondent's vehicle. (Tr. 14, 40-41, 52). 
During those tests respondent requested that Mangelson stop searching the 
vehicle. (Tr. 4 1 , 54) Mangelson responded, stating that based on the discovery of 
the marijuana in the ashtray, he had probable cause to search the entire vehicle. (Tr. 
42, 60) Eventually, Mangelson located a package in the spare tire compartment of 
the trunk. The package was in a plastic sack and covered with wrapping paper. On 
the outside, the word "Toyota" was written in large letters. The package was found 
to contain approximately one kilogram of cocaine. (Tr. 52) Respondent and 
Thompson were then arrested and booked into the Juab County jail. (Tr. 17). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The stop of respondent at the Juab County roadblock violated his right to be 
free from warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures as described in Article 
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I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. The officers lacked an individualized 
suspicion that respondent had committed a criminal offense. Furthermore, the officers 
had no statutory authority to conduct a roadblock. 
The evidence seized subsequent to respondent's voluntary consent to the 
search of his vehicle was closely related in time to the initial illegal roadblock stop. 
There were no intervening circumstances between the stop at the roadblock and the 
consent. Finally, the roadblock was a flagrant and purposeful constitutional 
violation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ROADBLOCK STOP OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE 
VIOLATED ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
The Court of Appeals concluded the stop of respondent at the roadblock 
violated both the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and Article l f 
Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. State v. Sims, supra. The state has not 
requested that this court review the fourth amendment issue. The state constitutional 
question has two issues. The first is that raised by cross petitioner: whether Article 
I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution requires a showing of individualized suspicion 
before a search or seizure may be conducted? That issue was raised in both the trial 
court and Court of Appeals. However, it was not addressed by the Court of Appeals. 
The second relates to the State's requested review of the Court of Appeals' ruling: 
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whether law enforcement officers need express statutory authority to conduct a 
roadblock? 
A. 
The Broader Protections Provided Under Article I, Section 
14 of the Utah Constitution and Should be Determined Prior 
to Addressing Fourth Amendment Issues. 
Two cases from this court have held that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution provides broader protections than the fourth amendment to the United 
States Constitution. In State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), the court held 
that Article I, Section 14 precludes the warrantless inspection of a vehicle 
identification number. In emergency situations probable cause and exigent 
circumstances would be required to be shown in lieu of a warrant. The court also 
held, " . . . this court will continue to use the concept of expectation of privacy as a 
suitable threshold criteria for determining whether Article I, Section 14 is applicable 
" 794 P.2d at 469. 
In State v. Thompson. 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), the court emphasized the 
expectation of privacy protected by Article I, Section 14. The court specifically held 
that individuals have a privacy interest in bank records. This was a privacy interest 
that the Supreme Court held was not protected by the fourth amendment. United 
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). In Thompson the attorney general had 
obtained an investigative subpoena pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-1 et. sea. 
(1953 as amended). The court noted that the subpoenas in question had previously 
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been found to be unconstitutional. In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 
1988). 
The state contended in Thompson that the evidence seized should not be 
suppressed because its agents had acted in good faith in obtaining the bank records. 
The state relied upon United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), as authority for 
that position. This argument was rejected because the representatives of the attorney 
general's office had not relied upon a determination by a magistrate. Nor had they 
relied upon the legislature's inadvertent abridgement of a constitutional right in a 
statute. 
The members of this court were severely divided on the issue of the 
applicability of Article I, Section 14 to roadblocks in Sims v. State Tax Commission, 
841 P.2d 6 (Utah 1992). That case involved the same stop and roadblock as the 
instant case. The critical question in that case was whether the exclusionary rule 
applied to the state illegal drug stamp tax proceedings pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-19-101 eLse^ (1953 as amended). Justices Durham and Zimmerman held that 
the roadblock violated Article I, Section 14. That was because the stop was made 
with neither individualized suspicion nor express legislative authorization. Justices 
Hall and Howe dissented in the result. They felt it was unnecessary to address the 
issue of the constitutionality of the roadblock as the case could be decided on the 
question of the application of the exclusionary rule to tax stamp proceedings. Justice 
Stewart concurred in the ultimate result and took the position that the Utah 
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Constitutional issue need not be reached because the roadblock issue could be 
decided on fourth amendment grounds. 
Justice Stewart's opinion raised the question of whether a state constitutional 
issue should be decided before or after the court decides a federal constitutional issue. 
For historical and practical reasons the state constitutional issue should be decided 
first. From the historical perspective, the federal bill of rights was adopted after state 
constitutions had enacted bills of rights. The bill of rights in the Utah State 
Constitution is modeled after other state constitutions rather than the federal 
constitution amendments.1 Only after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment 
were the federal bill of rights applicable to the states. Specifically, the federal fourth 
amendment protections were not applicable to the states until the decision in Mapp 
v- Ohio. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). From the historical perspective, the state constitutions 
have been the primary source for the protection of individual liberties. There is a 
historic justification in this court adopting a procedure where state constitutional 
issues are decided prior to decisions being rendered on federal constitutional grounds. 
Several practical considerations also justify such a procedure. First, this is a 
case that involved actions and decisions by state police agencies. There was no 
federal law enforcement involvement. The actions of state police officers should be 
1Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government, The History of Utah's 
Constitution. 1966 Utah L. Rev. 311. 
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governed by state rather then federal law whenever practical. Second, there is a need 
for finality in litigation, especially in criminal cases. Decisions based solely on state 
constitutional grounds are not reviewable by the United States Supreme Court. 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). A decision by this court based solely on 
independent state constitutional grounds would be final. Finally, such a procedure 
furthers the policy of avoiding the resolution of a case on federal constitutional 
grounds if there is another basis for a decision. In Spector Motor Service v. 
McLaughlin. 423 U.S. 101 (1944), the Supreme Court indicated that it should not 
decide issues of federal constitutional law until after the statutory and state 
constitutional claims are resolved. 
B. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution Requires 
Individualized Suspicion to Justify a Search or Seizure. 
When a vehicle is stopped at a roadblock, there is no probable cause or other 
individualized suspicion that the occupants are engaged in any wrongdoing. Courts 
that have upheld the use of roadblocks have done so on the theory that the 
individual's fourth amendment interests need to be balanced against society's interest 
in efficient enforcement of the law.2 In doing so, the procedures employed at the 
roadblock must include strict limitations on the discretion of the officers who man the 
roadblock. Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz. supra. This argument was 
2See: Point I.D. 
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rejected by Justices Zimmerman and Durham in Sims v. State Tax Commission, supra. 
The legal basis for their position was that in State v. Larocco. supra, the court held 
that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution required probable cause to stop or 
search a vehicle. Such individualized suspicion is not present at a roadblock. 
Other courts have rejected the reasoning that the Supreme Court applied in Sitz. 
In Pimentel v. Department of Transportation. 561 A.2d 1348 (R.I. 1989), the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court held that a roadblock established specifically to apprehend 
drunk drivers violated that state's constitution. The court acknowledged the need to 
apprehend and punish those who commit crimes. The court also noted that the Rhode 
Island constitution and statues required individualized suspicion that a crime had been 
committed before a stop could be made. The state contended that the needs of law 
enforcement should be balanced against the constitutional violation. In balancing 
these interests, the court stated, 
. . . it would shock and offend the framers of the 
Rhode Island Constitution if we were to hold that the 
guarantees against unreasonable and warrantless searches 
and seizures should be subordinated to the interest of 
efficient law enforcement. Once this barrier is breached in 
the interest of apprehending drivers who violate sobriety 
laws, the tide of law enforcement interest could overwhelm 
the right to privacy. We decline to take the step of 
approving roadblocks, even for the purpose of 
apprehending drunk drivers. 
561 A2.d at 1352. 
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The state in Pimentel also contended that roadblocks deter crimes and that the 
guidelines of the roadblock program provided sufficient limits on the officers' 
discretion. With respect to the deterrence argument, the court stated, 
Even assuming that roadblocks may have some 
deterrent effect, we believe that it is purchased at too high 
a price. Doubtless other devices may also increase the 
effectiveness of law enforcement, including punishment 
without trial, repealing of the privilege against self-
incrimination, dispensing with the right to confrontation of 
witnesses, and elimination of trial by jury. Such 
techniques, however, would diminish the rights of all in 
order to secure the punishment of a few. 
Id at 1352. The court also rejected the position that limits on officers' discretion 
justified the intrusion of the roadblock. In doing so the court held, 
Nevertheless no control of discretion can justify roadblock 
seizures under Rhode Island law because they are 
conducted totally in the absence of probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion that a motor-vehicle violation had 
occurred. Whereas other states supporting the 
constitutionality of roadblock programs may find the drunk-
driving problem outweighs the privacy interest of 
individuals, the Rhode Island Constitution grants greater 
protection and requires the our citizens be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures of this nature. 
Id at 1353. 
Other courts have also rejected the reasoning for the holding in Sitz and 
required individualized suspicion before a vehicle may be stopped. That was the 
position taken by the supreme courts of Idaho, Oregon and Louisiana. State v. 
Henderson. 114 Ida. 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (Ida. 1988); State v. Bovanovsky. 304 Or 
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131, 743P.2d711 (Or 1987): and State v. Church. 538 So.2d 993 (La. 1989). The 
appellate court in Michigan also its state constitution requires individualized suspicion 
for a roadblock stop. That court went on to hold that roadblocks violate the Michigan 
constitution, Sitz v. Department of State Police. 485 NW.2d 135 (Mich. App. 1992). 
That was the same case in which the Supreme Court held that roadblocks conducted 
under limited circumstances did not violate the fourth amendment.3 
In this case, Trooper Howard testified that the only reason for the stop of 
appellant's vehicle was the roadblock. The trooper candidly admitted that prior to the 
stop there was no probable cause to believe that appellant was engaged in any 
criminal conduct. Likewise, the trooper also admitted that prior to the stop he could 
not articulate any facts or circumstances to indicate that appellant was involved in 
any criminal conduct. For this reason, the stop of appellant's vehicle violated Article 
I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. 
C. 
A Stop Conducted Without Authority of Law Violates 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. 
The majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals in the instant case ruled that 
the lack of statutory authority to conduct a roadblock constituted a violation of 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. State v. Sims, supra. That position 
was also taken by Justices Durham and Zimmerman in Sims v. State Tax Commission, 
3Michiaan Department of Public Safety v. Sitz, supra. 
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supra. The state contends that this position is erroneous. That contention is based 
on the argument that a lack of statutory authority may render a police act to be illegal 
but not unconstitutional. The state's position is that the judiciary rather than the 
legislature sets constitutional limitations on police actions. The state's position 
disregards the need to place legal limitations on the actions of the executive branch 
of government. It also disregards the nature and purpose of Article I, Section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution with respect to limitations on police powers. Finally, the state's 
position disregards the interrelationship of the constitutional separation of powers 
doctrine and Article I, Section 14. 
This court has held that the basic purpose of Article I, Section 14 is to protect 
privacy interests. State v. Larocco. supra; State v. Thompson, supra. The method 
that is provided to protect these privacy interests is to limit police authority to 
conduct searches and seizures. The limitations that Article I, Section 14 places on 
law enforcement is to require that searches or seizures be made pursuant to a 
warrant. State v. Larocco, supra. That requirement interposes a prior review of the 
probable cause required for a search or seizure by the judiciary. Article I. Section 14 
also requires that the police actions be reasonable. 
There are two ways to analyze the requirement for legislative authorization 
under Article I, Section 14. The first focuses on the warrant requirement. Under that 
theory, the legislative authorization may be analogous to the judicial authorization 
necessary to obtain a warrant. The second theory focuses on the reasonableness 
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provision of Article I, Section 14. That theory essentially engrafts the constitutional 
separation of powers doctrine onto Article I, Section 14. The essence of that theory 
is that a search conducted without legal authority should be regarded as 
unreasonable. 
1. 
The Warrant Requirement 
The first type of analysis focusing on the warrant requirement was employed 
by the Court of Appeals in the instant case, State v. Sims, supra. The court held that 
police officers themselves should not determine if a roadblock should be employed. 
The position that the court took was that the determination to allow such stops 
should be made independent of the executive branch of the government. The court 
then found that the decision of the legislature in authorizing roadblock stops was 
analogous to the decision that a judge makes in issuing a search warrant. In 
summarizing its position, the court of appeals stated, 
We believe that legislative authorization of ports of 
entry and fish and game checkpoints, like the issuance of 
a judicial warrant, triggers at least some presumption that 
these law enforcement practices are constitutionally 
permissible. Because the roadblock in this case had neither 
form of authorization, it was entitled to no such 
presumption. Both warrants and statutes originate outside 
the executive branch, serving to check abuses of that 
branch's law enforcement power. Consistent with our 
supreme court's emphasis on the warrant requirement, 
then, we hold that suspicionless, investigatory motor 
vehicle roadblocks, conducted without legislative 
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authorization, are per se unconstitutional under article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
808 P.2dat 149. 
The state's criticism of this holding does not relate to the need for the decision 
to allow suspicionless stops to come from outside the executive branch of 
government. Rather, the state focuses on the lower court's analogy of the legislative 
process to the judicial function. The state then contends that the court of appeals' 
position is wrong because there is a substantial difference between the executive and 
legislative branches of government.4 
The state does not address the problem of allowing the executive branch 
determine the nature extent of its own powers. Rather, the state contends that the 
power to conduct roadblocks should be implied from broad statutory authorizations 
of police powers. Further, the state also asserts that certain police procedures are 
currently employed without specific statutory authorization. With respect to implying 
police powers, the statutes that would potentially authorize roadblocks both require 
that an officer have at least a reasonable suspicion to stop.5 As previously noted, 
there is no individualized suspicion in a roadblock stop. 
4Brief of Petitioner at pp. 7-9. 
5Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-1-17(c) and 77-7-15 (1953 as amended). 
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The state contends that inventory searches6 and searches incident to arrest7 
are not authorized by statute and do not require individualized suspicion or a warrant. 
However, in Hvgh the court required "reasonable and proper justification" to conduct 
an inventory search. That justification must be either based on statutory authorization 
or the circumstances of the vehicle stop. In other words, an individualized suspicion 
is required. A search incident to arrest requires probable cause to arrest. State v. 
Banks, supra. Furthermore, the power to arrest is authorized by statute. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-7-1 et. seq. (1953 as amended). The state's claim that inventory searches 
and seizures incident to arrest are not authorized by statute and do not require 
individualized suspicion is wrong. 
In Sims v. State Tax Commission, supra, Justices Durham and Zimmerman also 
focused on the warrant requirement of Article I, Section 14 in finding that statutory 
authorization for a roadblock was required. In doing so, it was noted, 
"The requirement that a disinterested party review and 
approve the need to search was designed to prevent 
arbitrary and oppressive interference with individual privacy 
and personal security and to guarantee that a decision to 
search private property is justified by a reasonable 
governmental interest." 
841 P.2d at 9. The state's only response to this policy is that it does not reflect the 
views of a majority of the court. Clearly, the warrant requirement of Article I, Section 
6State vHvah. 711 P.2d 264 (Utah, 1985). 
7State v. Banks. 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986). 
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14 of the Utah Constitution justifies a requirement that specific statutory authorization 
is necessary to conduct a roadblock. 
2. 
The Reasonableness Requirement 
The provision of Article I, Section 14 requiring that searches or seizures be 
reasonable may also justify a requirement that a roadblock have express statutory 
authorization. Under such an analysis the separation of powers doctrine is 
incorporated into the Article I, Section 14 limitations on the authority of law 
enforcement. With respect to the criminal law, the separation of powers doctrine 
requires that the laws to be enforced be established by the legislature. The legislature 
cannot delegate that authority to the executive branch of the government. In State 
v. Gallion. 572 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977), this court held that the legislature could not 
delegate to the attorney general the power to decide what drugs should be designated 
to be controlled substances.8 
The legislature also gives the executive branch the power to investigate criminal 
offenses. Unless the police action involves some exigent circumstance these statutes 
generally interpose judicial approval of the investigatory action. See generally: Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-1a-1 et. sea. (1953 as amended) (Peace officer designation); Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-7-1 eLsefl i (1953 as amended) (Authority to arrest); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-22-1 e t sea. (1953 as amended) (Subpoena Powers for Aid of Criminal 
8See: Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-4 and 8 (1953 as amended). 
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Investigation); Utah Code Ann. § 77-22a-1 £L sea. (1953 as amended) 
(Administrative Subpoenas in Controlled Substances Investigations); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-23-1 et. seq. (1953 as amended) (Search and Administrative warrants); Utah 
Code Ann, § 77-23a-1 et. seq. (1953 as amended): (Interception of Communications): 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-1 (1953 as amended) (Enforcement of motor vehicle 
requirements). 
In State v. Thompson, supra, this court indicated that law enforcement officers 
cannot claim to have acted in good faith when a search or seizure is conducted 
without prior judicial authorization or in execution of a statutory regulatory scheme.9 
In other words, such police actions would be unreasonable. The lack of statutory 
authority to conduct a roadblock made the actions of the officers involved in this case 
unreasonable. To allow law enforcement officers to act without statutory or judicial 
authorization is a very dangerous precedent. It would make the only check on the 
authority of the executive branch an after the fact judicial review. The legal 
authorization for the particular police action in question would not be a subject of that 
review. That fails to meet the requirements of the doctrine of separation of powers 
under our constitutional framework. Consequently, a lack of statutory authorization 
for police actions makes such actions unreasonable and violates Article I, Section 14 
of the Utah Constitution. 
See: United States v. Leon, supra. 
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Several state courts have specifically addressed the need for statutory authority 
to enable law enforcement agents to conduct a roadblock. The Supreme Court of 
Oregon addressed this issue in the context of a civil suit for damages by a plaintiff 
who was stopped at a roadblock. Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692 
(Or. 1987). Two other criminal cases involving similar roadblocks were addressed by 
that court at that time: State v. Bovanovskv. supra, and State v. Anderson. 304 Or. 
139, 743 P.2d 715 (Or. 1987). In Nelson v. Lane County, supra, the state sought 
to uphold the use of a roadblock on the basis that such a seizure was constitutionally 
authorized. 
In Nelson, the state maintained that it had statutory authority to conduct a 
roadblock under a general statute that gave law enforcement agencies the authority 
to enforce the criminal law. The state claimed that the statue implicitly authorized 
roadblocks and that the roadblock in question was conducted in accordance with "The 
Oregon State Police Patrol Manual." In rejecting this argument, the court reasoned, 
By and large, agencies of the executive branch are free to 
carry out their assigned responsibilities in ways of their 
own choosing. Making explicit the manner in which any 
agency is to accomplish its tasks falls to the agency head 
or that official's designee to instruct or sub-delegate to 
subordinated officials. 
However, some procedures may invade the personal 
freedoms protected from government interference by the 
constitution. Roadblocks are seizures of the person, 
possibly to be followed by a search of the person or the 
person's effects. For this reason, the authority to conduct 
roadblocks cannot be implied. Before they search or seize, 
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executive agencies must have explicit authority from 
outside the executive branch. 
743 P.2d at 695. 
Similarly, in State v. Henderson, supra, the Supreme Court of Idaho held that 
its constitutional provision prohibiting warrantless and unreasonable searches and 
seizures required express legislative authority to conduct a roadblock. The Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals found roadblocks to be unreasonable based on the 
Oklahoma Constitution. A basis for the court's decision was that officers lacked 
statutory authority to make such stops. State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. 1984). 
In Utah there is no express statutory authority allowing law enforcement agents to 
conduct a roadblock.10 The use of a roadblock was unlawful and therefore 
unreasonable under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
D. 
The Use of a Balancing Test to Determine Article I, Section 
14 Issues Should be Rejected. 
The state has cited several cases that hold that express statutory authority is 
not necessary for law enforcement officers to conduct a roadblock. People v. Estrada. 
68 III. App. 3d 272, 386 N.E. 2.d 128 cert, denied 444 U.S. 968 (1979); Davis v. 
Kansas Department of Revenue. 843 P.2d 260 (Kan. 1992); Orr v. People. 803 P.2d 
10Davis and Wallentine, A Model for Analyzing the Constitutionality of Sobriety 
Roadblock Stops in Utah. 3 B.Y.U. I. of Pub. Law 557 (1989), also concludes that 
there is no legal authority in Utah to conduct roadblock stops. A roadblock, the 
authors further conclude, would be unconstitutional. 
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509 (Colo. 1992); Inoersoll v. Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299 (Cal. 1987). These cases 
generally take the position that a legislative grant of authority to enforce the law 
carries with it an implicit authorization to enforce the law in a reasonable manner. 
They go on to hold that roadblocks are a reasonable method of law enforcement. 
Prior to reaching that conclusion, the court in each of these jurisdictions had 
held that the use of roadblocks did not violate the state's constitution. The reasoning 
used to reach that conclusion was based on a balancing test similar to that employed 
in Michigan Department of Public Safety v. Sitz. supra. Under that test, the court 
would balance the intrusion into the rights protected by the state's search and seizure 
provisions against the legitimate needs for law enforcement. In doing so, the focus 
of the constitutional analysis is on the "reasonableness" provision rather than the 
"warrant" requirement of the particular state constitution. 
When engaging in this analysis, these courts emphasize that a roadblock 
involves a minimal intrusion into personal rights, while there is a great need for society 
to prevent offenses such as drunk driving11 and to enforce safety equipment 
regulations.12 These cases give little or no significance to the fact that it is a 
constitutional right that is being weighed against a need of law enforcement. 
Furthermore, since these constitutional challenges arise in the context of a criminal 
proceeding, when the interests are balanced, law enforcement needs will generally 
11lnaersol v. Palmer, supra. 
12Peoole v. Estrada, supra. 
25 
prevail.13 Because the intrusion caused by a roadblock is minimal, secondary 
conclusion to this analysis is that there is no need for express statutory authorization 
to address this public problem. People v. Estrada, supra; Orr v. People, supra; 
Inaersoll v. Palmer, supra. 
There are a number of problems created when this type of balancing test is 
employed. The primary problem is that in order to engage in the analysis there must 
first be a constitutional violation. By balancing that violation against society's 
interest, the courts are simply legitimizing the constitutional violation. The courts then 
become a party to the violation by allowing evidence seized as a result of that 
violation to be used in court. Furthermore, if law enforcement agents are aware that 
they need only be able to claim that a novel, but unlawful, enforcement technique can 
be balanced against societal interests, then there will be little to deter officers from 
engaging in that activity. These are the same problems that the court recognized in 
State v. Arrovo. supra, that justified application of the exclusionary rule. These same 
policies should preclude this court from engaging in a balancing test to resolve Article 
I, Section 14 issues. 
The final problem with utilizing this balancing test is that it allows the warrant 
and probable cause requirements to be read out of Article I, Section 14. That effect 
was recognized by this court in State v. Larocco. supra. In that case the court opted 
13Evidence of a crime will be suppressed, and a person who has committed a 
criminal offense will go free if the balance does not weigh in favor of the state. 
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to follow what Justice Durham has described as the "warrant approach" to Article I, 
Section 14 analysis.14 In employing that analysis, an officer must have a warrant 
to make a stop or arrest. If it is not possible to obtain a warrant, the court indicated 
that probable cause and exigent circumstances must be present. By engaging in this 
analysis, Justices Durham and Zimmerman refused to find that the authority to 
conduct a suspicionless roadblock stop could be implied from general statutory 
directives to enforce the vehicle code. Sims v. State Tax Commission, supra. 
In the instant case, the officers who manned the roadblock indicated it was 
established for a number of purposes. Those purposes included enforcement of the 
provisions at the Motor Vehicle Code, Criminal Code, and Controlled Substances Act. 
The legal authority to conduct suspicionless stops for such general law enforcement 
purposes cannot be implied. Without such authority, the roadblock in this case was 
conducted without authority of law. A stop without legal authority violates the 
warrant and reasonableness requirements of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
E. 
The Utah Constitutional Issue Should be Addressed and the 
Court Should Find that Roadblock Stops Violate Article I, 
Section 14. 
This case presents two important issues with respect to the application of 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The first relates whether this court will 
uSims v. State Tax Commissioner, supra, at 8. 
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address state constitutional questions prior to deciding an issue based on the federal 
constitution. Clearly, the roadblock issue in this case could, and has been decided, 
on a fourth amendment basis. However, history and public policy should require that 
this court address the state constitutional issues relating to the roadblock. 
Should this court address the state constitutional issues, a primary concern will 
be whether the analysis involves a balancing test. If the court rejects that test, the 
state must show that there was both individualized suspicion that respondent 
committed a crime and legal authority to conduct the roadblock. On the other hand, 
employing a balancing test would allow the court to follow the federal-type precedent. 
This would require that the court abandon the analysis that led to the conclusion in 
Larocco and effectively eliminate the warrant requirements of Article I, Section 14. 
A test that balances law enforcement interests against constitutional violations should 
be rejected. This court should find that the roadblock stop of respondent violated 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
POINT II 
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT ATTENUATION BETWEEN THE 
ILLEGAL ROADBLOCK STOP AND THE VOLUNTARY 
CONSENT TO SEARCH TO ALLOW THE EVIDENCE SEIZED 
TO BE ADMISSIBLE. 
The state contends that the holding in Sims v. State Tax Commission, supra. 
is at odds or inconsistent with State v. Thurman. supra. Both of those cases 
addressed issue of the admissibility of evidence seized subsequent to a voluntary 
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consent which followed an illegal search. In State v. Arrovo. supra, this court held 
that in such a situation the consent must not only be voluntary, but that consent must 
be sufficiently attenuated form the initial illegality to dissipate the taint from that 
illegality. It is this attenuation analysis that the state claims to be the basis of 
inconsistent holdings. A review of the development of the law on this issue and a 
comparison of the facts of Thurman and the instant case will demonstrate that there 
are no inconsistences in the holdings. 
The attenuation issue was first addressed by the Court of Appeals in State v. 
Sierra. 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988). The court held that the only test to 
determine the admissibility of evidence seized when a consent followed an illegal stop 
was the voluntariness of the consent. As authority for that conclusion, the court 
relied on United States v. Carson. 793 F.2d 1141 (1 Oth Cir.), cert, denied. 479 U.S. 
914 (1986). In State v. Arrovo. supra, this court rejected that analysis. The court 
reasoned that not addressing an attenuation analysis" . . . failed to give proper weight 
to fourth Amendment values" 796 P.2d at 689. The court also noted that such a rule 
also failed to provide adequate deterrence to law enforcement officers. It allowed 
officers " . . to ratify their own illegal conduct by merely obtaining a consent after the 
illegality has occurred." 796 P.2d at 689. In Arrovo. the only discussion of the type 
of analysis to employ in making the attenuation determination was in a footnote.15 
15State v. Arrovo. supra at 690-691 (Fn. 4). 
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In that footnote, it was suggested that the factors discussed in Brown v. Illinois. 422 
U.S. 590 (1975); and LaFave. Search and Seizure, § 2(d) at 193-94 (2nd ed. 1987), 
should be considered in determining this whether a voluntary consent was sufficiently 
attenuated from an illegal stop. 
The attenuation issue was next addressed by this court in Sims v. State Tax 
Commission, supra. In that case a majority of the court held that the close proximity 
in time to the initial stop and the lack of intervening circumstances invalidated any 
voluntary consent. That case involved the same stop as the instant case. However, 
as previously noted, the state contends that its holding is inconsistent with Thurman. 
A close analysis of both of those cases shows that the holdings are not inconsistent. 
In Sims v. State Tax Commission, supra, the court indicated that the attenuation 
analysis should focus on the factors described in Brown v. Illinois, supra. Those 
factors included: the temporal proximity of the illegal seizure and the consent, the 
presence of intervening circumstances and the purpose and flagrancy of the official 
misconduct. In considering the totality of the circumstances, the court also noted 
that two other factors should be discussed. The court stated, 
In considering the factors listed in Brown, account 
should also be taken of whether the illegal seizure brought 
about police observation of the particular object they 
sought consent to search, whether the consent was 
volunteered rather than requested by the detaining officers, 
whether the detainee was made aware of the fact that he 
could decline to consent and thus prevent an immediate 
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search, and whether the police purpose underlying the 
illegality was to obtain the consent. 
841 P.2dat 10. 
In analyzing these factors in light of the circumstances of this case, the court 
in Sims v. State Tax Commission, stated, 
Regarding the temporal proximity factor, Sims' 
consent was closely related in time to the initial stop. He 
consented during the unlawful detention with no 
intervening circumstances. The purpose of the roadblock 
was to obtain evidence of criminal violations, a purpose 
that does nothing to reduce the "flagrancy" of the 
constitutional violation it precipitated. Trooper Howard's 
request for consent to search Sims' vehicle was based 
upon the smell of alcohol, the sight of an open liquor bottle, 
and Sims' admission that he was carrying alcohol. 
Howard's opportunity to make these observations and to 
question Sims came about as a direct result of the illegal 
seizure. Sims did not spontaneously volunteer his consent, 
nor was he made aware of the fact that he could decline 
consent. 
Given the totality of these circumstances in light of 
the relevant considerations, the voluntary consent in this 
case clearly was arrived at by exploitation of the 
unconstitutional roadblock. The consent did not, therefore, 
purge the evidence of the taint of illegality, 
id at 10. 
In State v. Thurman, supra, the court also addressed the deterrent purpose in 
the attenuation requirement. The court related the factors described in Brown v. 
Illinois, supra, to this deterrent purpose. The importance of deterrence of flagrant or 
purposeful police misconduct was noted. With respect to the other factors the court 
stated, 
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The deterrent value of suppressing evidence seized 
following police illegality is negligible where the subsequent 
consent to search is substantially separated either 
temporally or circumstantially from the illegality. 
846 P.2d at 1264. The court went on to describe how a flagrant or purposeful 
fourth amendment violation would need to be followed by a substantial period of 
time16 or significant intervening circumstances17 before a voluntary consent would 
enable the seized evidence to be admissible. 
The court in Thurman did not elaborate on the question of what might 
constitute a purposeful or flagrant fourth amendment violation. However, the court 
did state, 
As the foregoing should suggest, the exploitation 
analysis requires a balancing of the relative egregiousness 
of the misconduct against the time and circumstances that 
intervene before the consent is given. The nature and 
degree of the illegality will usually be inversely related to 
16ln this case there was an extremely short period of time between the stop and 
the consent, Sims v. State Tax Commissioner, supra. 
17ln Thurman the court found intervening circumstances to include the signing of 
a second consent to search form and the transportation to a second location. Other 
courts have found intervening circumstances to include release from custody, an 
appearance before the magistrate, discussions with a lawyer, or a conviction on an 
unrelated charge, United States v. Delaadillo-VelasQuez. 856 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 
1988); giving of the Miranda warning and allowing the defendant to consult with a 
passenger, United States v. Berrv, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1983); Juarez v. State. 
708708 S.W. 2d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), telling the defendant that he did not 
have to consent to the search, Reves v. State, 741 S.W. 2d 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1987); developing probable cause from independent sources to justify the detention 
United States v. Cherry, 794 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1986); and whether the consent was 
volunteered or requested, People v. Boraes, 69 N.Y. 2.d 1031, 511 N.E. 2d 58 
(1987). 
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the effectiveness of time and intervening events to 
dissipate the presumed taint. Where the misconduct is 
extreme, we will require a clean break in the chain of 
events between the misconduct and the consent to find the 
consent valid. . . . The same type of break should be 
required where the evidence shows that the police 
purposely engaged in conduct to induce a consent. 
Conversely, where it appears that the illegality arose as the 
result of negligence, the lapse of time between the 
misconduct and the consent and the presence of 
intervening events become less critical to the dissipation of 
the taint. 
IsL 
Other courts have addressed that issue of what constitutes a purposeful or 
flagrant violation. In United States v. Pierre, 932 F.2d 377 (5th Cir., 1991), the court 
described three circumstances that would indicate that a search was purposeful or 
flagrant: First it was made for the purpose of uncovering evidence of wrongdoing. 
Second, the stop was conducted without a hint of individualized suspicion.18 Third, 
the stop or search was part of an ongoing series of illegal searches. Other indications 
of a purposeful or flagrant violation include: the use of firearms to effect the arrest, 
People v. Odom. 83 III. App. 3d 1022, 404 N.E. 2d 997 (1980); a manner of arrest 
or detention that caused confusion, surprise or fright, United States v. Delqadiflo-
Velasauez. supra; the circumstances of the detention reflect that officers were on an 
expedition to find evidence, Reves v. State, supra; or the use of threats or physical 
force, United States v. Perez-Esoarza. 609 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1980). 
18See also: United States v. Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356 (11th Cir. 1983); State 
v. Zielmen. 384 So. 2d 359 (La. 1980). 
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In the instant case, the respondent's vehicle was stopped without any 
individualized suspicion. There was no specific purpose for the roadblock. It was not 
aimed at problems such as locating driver's license violators or drunk drivers. This 
case involved a roadblock where a number of cars were stopped. By definition there 
was a pattern of stops. It also included a showing of police authority. This court held 
i n
 Sims v. State Tax Commission, "The purpose of the roadblock was to obtain 
evidence of criminal violations, a purpose that does nothing to reduce the 'flagrancy' 
of the constitutional violation it precipitated" 841 P.2d at 10. 
There is no inconsistency between the holdings in Sims v. State Tax 
Commission, supra, and State v. Thurman. supra. The fourth amendment violation 
in the instant case was flagrant and purposeful. It is easy to conceive of more 
flagrant violations. However, when a violation of this nature is balanced against he 
fact that the consent followed almost immediately after the stop and that there were 
no intervening circumstances, there is a lack of attenuation making the evidence 
admissible in spite of the voluntary consent. 
In its brief to this court in the instant case, the state fails to provide the analysis 
required by Thurman. The only factor that the state addressed is the flagrancy of the 
misconduct. For the court to adopt the states's suggested analysis, it would have to 
disregard the factors of temporal proximity and intervening circumstances. 
Furthermore, the state's position on the lack of flagrancy of the constitutional 
violation is very weak. The only reason given by the state to show that the violation 
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was not flagrant was that there were no Utah cases addressing the constitutionality 
of roadblocks. The state also contends that Utah officers could believe roadblocks 
were lawful because the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had upheld New Mexico 
roadblocks.19 This position disregards the fact that there was no statutory authority 
to conduct a roadblock.20 Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit cases upheld single 
purpose roadblocks. A multipurpose roadblock, as used in this case, had been 
implicitly rejected by that court, United States v. Lopez, supra. Finally, even in those 
jurisdictions where roadblocks have been upheld, precautions had been taken to limit 
the discretion of the officers who were involved in the conduct of the roadblock. 
Similar precautions had not been taken in this case.21 The only conclusion that can 
be reached is that the roadblock employed in this case consisted of a purposeful and 
flagrant constitutional violation. 
This court should not change or modify its holding in Sims v. State Tax 
Commission, supra, on the attenuation issue. The roadblock utilized in this case was 
a flagrant and purposeful violation of the fourth amendment and Article I, Section 14 
of the Utah Constitution. The consent that followed the roadblock stop was in close 
19United States v. Prichard 645 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. 
Oberaon. 748 F.2d 1371 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Lopez. 777 F.2d 543 
(10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Corral. 823 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1987). 
20See point I.C. supra. 
21See Respondent's opening brief filed in the Court of Appeals(attached in the 
addendum). 
35 
temporal proximity to the stop. There were no intervening circumstances between 
the stop and the consent. There was insufficient attenuation between the stop of 
respondent's vehicle and the voluntary consent to make the fruits of the search 
admissible. This court's ruling in Sims v. State Tax Commission, supra, should be 
reaffirmed, that would also result in affirming the court of appeals' ruling on this 
issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The ruling of the court of appeals should be affirmed. This court should hold 
that the roadblock violated Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Furthermore, the court should find that the voluntary consent was not sufficiently 
attenuated from the illegal stop to preclude the application of the exclusionary rule. 
The case should be remanded to the court of appeals with an order directing the court 
of appeals to further remand the case to the district court with an order that a new 
trial be granted at which the evidence seized during the search of respondent's vehicle 
will not be admitted. 
DATED this day of June, 1993. 
G. FRED METOS 
Attorney for Respondent 
36 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy 
on this day of June, 1993, to: 
the foregoing was mailed/hand delivered 
DAVID THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM 
DEFENDANT APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF ON APPEAL 
POINT II 
POINT II 
THE ROADBLOCK AT WHICH APPELLANT WAS 
STOPPED DID NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT 
SAFEGUARDS TO LIMIT THE DISCRETION OF 
THE OFFICERS CONDUCTING IT, NOR DID IT 
MINIMIZE THE INTERFERENCE WITH 
MOTORISTS' PRIVACY INTERESTS, THUS 
VIOLATING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 
The warrantless stop of appellant's vehicle was a 
"seizure" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment as applied to the 
States by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, State v. Sierra, supra. To determine if a stop 
qualifies as an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment, a balancing test is to be employed, Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
The Supreme Court has applied this balancing test in 
cases involving border searches for illegal aliens. These cases 
have been applied by courts in analyzing roadblock stops. In 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 226 (1973), the Court 
found a Fourth Amendment violation in the stop and search of a 
moving vehicle by a roving border patrol. In that case the agents 
had no warrant, consent, probable cause or reasonable suspicion to 
stop the vehicle in question. The Court in Almeida-Sanchez 
specifically noted that the governemnt has an interest in 
prohibiting or preventing aliens from illegally entering the 
country. However, that interest did not override the protections 
of the Fourth Amendment, The use of roving patrols to stop a 
vehicle and question the occupants about their citizenship and 
immigration status was also found to violate the Fourth Amendment. 
United States v. Briqnoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). Such a stop 
would be proper if the officers were aware of specific articulable 
facts that would warrant suspicion that vehicle contains illegal 
aliens. 
With respect to a permanent checkpoint, the Court has 
held that border patrol agents cannot search a vehicle without a 
warrant, probable cause or reasonable suspicion. United States v. 
Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975). However, in United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte. 428 U.S. 543 (1976), the Court held that the 
brief questioning of vehicle occupants at a permanent checkpoint 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court made two critical 
distinctions between a permanent checkpoint and the roving 
patrols. First, the permanent checkpoint involved minimal 
potential interference with legitimate traffic. This is because 
motorists using the highways are not taken by surprise as to the 
location of the checkpoint. Second, checkpoint operations involve 
less discretion in law enforcement activity. With respect to this 
factor, the court made several observations: The location of the 
checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field. That decision 
is made by officials responsible for allocating law enforcement 
resources. Finally, there is little likelihood that the 
checkpoint will be located where it will bear oppressively or 
arbitrarily on motorists* There is less room for abusive or 
harassing stops of individuals* 
The Supreme Court applied this reasoning to "spot 
checks" of motorists for licensing and registration checks. 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). In that case an officer 
stopped a motorist to make such a check. The officer did not have 
a warrant, probable cause, or articulable suspicion that the 
driver of the vehicle has been involved in any violation of the 
law. With respect to the test to be employed to determine the 
propriety of the stop, the Court stated: 
...the permissibility of a particular law 
enforcement practice is judged by balancing 
its intrusion on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interest against its promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests. 
Implemented in this manner, the 
reasonableness standard ususally requires, at 
a minimum, that the facts upon which an 
intrustion is based be capable of measurement 
against "an objective standard", whether this 
be probable cause or a less stringent test. 
In those situations in which the balance of 
interests precludes insistence upon "some 
quantum of individualized suspicion", other 
safeguards are generally relied upon to 
assure that the individual's reasonable 
expection of privacy is not "subject to the 
discretion of the official in the field", 
[footnotes ommitted] 
440 U.S. at 654-655. 
The Court noted that the interest asserted by the state 
was highway safety. The discretionary stop allowed officers to 
make sure that the driver was properly licensed and insured and 
that the vehicle was registered and safe to operate. The Court 
held that those interests do not outweigh the Fourth Amendment 
violations. This is especially true when considered in light of 
mechanisms available to enforce traffic and safety regulations. 
The Court stated that the foremost method of enforcing vehicle and 
safety regulations is that of acting on observed violations. It 
was noted that unlicensed drivers are more likely to be found 
among traffic violators and the chances of finding such a driver 
by enforcing the traffic code would be much greater than by 
randomly stopping drivers. The Court stated that violations 
involving safety inspections generally are readily observable 
from the road. Futhermore, in order for a vehicle to be licensed, 
it must pass a safety inspection and the owner must show proof of 
insurance. 
The Court found that such "discretionary" stops 
violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court then went on to state in 
dicta that roadblock stops may be permissible under the Fourth 
Amendment: 
Accordingly, we hold that except in those 
situations in which there is at least 
articulable and reasonable suspicion that a 
motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile 
is not registered, or that either the vehicle 
or an occupant is otherwise subject to 
seizure for violation of law, stopping an 
automobile and detaining the driver in order 
to check his driver's license and the 
registration of the automobile are 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
This holding does not preclude the State of 
Delaware or other States from developing 
methods for spot checks that involve less 
intrusion or that do not involve the 
unconstrained exercise of discretion. 
Questioning of all oncoming traffic at 
roadblock-type stops is one possible 
alternative. We hold only that persons in 
automobiles on public roadways may not for 
that reason alone have their travel and 
privacy interfered with at the unbridled 
discretion of police officers. [footnote 
ommitted] 
440 U.S. at 6639 
In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), the Court 
considered the constitutionality of a provision of the Texas Penal 
Code which made it a crime for a person to refuse to give his 
identity to a police officer upon request. Citing Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court noted that the Fourth Amendment 
allowed seizures of a person based on less than probable cause. 
In determinng the reasonableness of such seizures, the Court 
stated: 
The reasonableness of seizures that are less 
intrusive than a traditional arrest 
[citations ommitted] depends "'on a balance 
between the public interest and the 
individual's right to personal scrutiny free 
from arbitrary interference by law 
officers'". [citations ommitted] 
Consideration of the constitutionality of 
such seizures involve a weighing of the 
gravity of the public concerns served by the 
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, cert. 
granted U.S. (1989) the Court granted certiorari to 
review roadblock procedures under the Fourth Amendment. 
seizure, the degree to which the seizure 
advances the public interest, and the 
severity of the interference with individual 
liberty. 
Brown v, Texas, supra at 50-52. The Court went on to apply the 
test to that appellant's case, stating, 
In the absence of any basis for suspecting 
appellant of misconduct, the balance between 
the public interest and appellant's right to 
personal security and privacy tilts in favor 
of freedom from police interference. The 
Texas statute under which appellant was 
stopped and required to identify himself is 
designed to advance a weighty social 
objective in large metropolitan centers: 
prevention of crime. But even assuming that 
purpose is served to some degree by stopping 
and demanding identification from an 
individual without any specific basis for 
believing he is involved in criminal 
activity, the guarantees of the Fourth 
Amendment do not allow it. When such a stop 
is not based on objective criteria, the risk 
of arbitrary and abusive police practices 
exceed tolerable limits. 
Brown v. Texas, supra at 52. 
A number of state courts have applied the analysis from 
Prouse and Brown to determine the propriety of roadblocks. In 
State v. Marchand, 104 Wash.2d 434, 706 P.2d 225 (Wash. 1985), the 
Supreme Court of Washington found the statement in Prouse relating 
to the propriety of roadblocks to be dicta. The court found that 
the primary concern in Prouse was to limit the discretion of the 
officers who were stopping motorists to inquire about driver's 
license and vehicle registrations. To analyze the limits of 
police discretion in roadblocks, the court in Marchand stated that 
two other issues had to be addressed: (1) What authority allows 
officers to stop motorists for this purpose? (2) Does that 
authority meet the criteria of Prouse? This analysis is 
consistent with the holding of the Supreme Court in Colonnade 
Catering Corporation v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970). In 
that case the Court held that evidence had to be suppressed when 
it was seized by state officers who lacked statutory authority to 
conduct the search. This result was required even though there 
was no Fourth Amendment violation. 
The court in Marchand, supra, found that officers had 
statutory authority to stop vehicles for the purpose of inspecting 
drivers' licenses and registration. However, that statute allowed 
for the same type of stops that were prohibited by Prouse. The 
statute allowed officers to stop motorists without probable cause 
or reasonable suspicion to inspect a driver's license and 
registration. The court held that these statutes imposed no 
constraints on the officers' discretion. Consequently, such 
statutes could not justify a roadblock on a highway. The State 
had argued that the Washington State Patrol had instituted 
guidelines to limit the discretion of officers. Because such 
guidelines do not carry the force and effect of a legislative act, 
the court held that they could not overcome the constitutional 
defects in that statute. 
Under the Marchand analysis the roadblock in this case 
also fails to pass constitutional muster. As previously 
discussed, in relation to the Utah Constitution, there is no 
statutory authority in Utah to conduct a roadblock. The Utah 
statutes require that the officers have an individualized 
suspicion of wrongdoing by the defendant before a stop may be 
effected. Since there is no Utah statute authorizing a 
roadblock, there is no limitation on the officers1 discretion in 
operating a roadblock. Consequently, the roadblock at issue here 
violates the Fourth Amendment. 
This court has addressed a roadblock stop in one 
12 instance.
 m Other state courts have relied on both the dicta 
from Prouse and the border patrol cases to uphold the use of 
roadblocks. However, in doing so, those courts have held that 
certain criteria must be met before a roadblock can be found to 
be "reasonable" as required by the Fourth Amendment. In State v. 
Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314 (Iowa 1980), the court ruled that a 
roadblock set up in a public park to take the names of drivers to 
investigate vandalism was unreasonable. The court noted that the 
11 See: Point I.A. supra. 
See, Utah Code Annotated § §77-7-15 and 44-1-17, (1953 as 
amended). 
12 
In an unpublished opinion this court found that a roadblock 
stop was unreasonable because all vehicles entering the roadblock 
were not stoppped. In so holding, this court relied on Delaware 
v. Prouse, supra. State v. Joe, Utah Court of Appeals, Case No,. 
870537-CA (1988). 
Fourth Amendment required that the degree of police intrusion be 
balanced against the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests. In analyzing the nature of the intrusion, the court 
required that the state must show that four criteria be met: (1) 
The checkpoint was selected for visibility to oncoming traffic. 
(2) There were adequate advance warning signs that informed 
motorists, in a timely manner, of the nature of the impending 
intrusion, (3) There were uniformed officers and official 
vehicles in sufficient quantity to demonstrate the police power 
of the community, (4) There must be a predetermination by 
policy making administrative officers of the time of the 
roadblock, its location and the procedures to be employed. All 
of these criteria must be met in carefully formulated standards 
and based on neutral criteria. 
In State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (Kan. 
1983), the defendant had been arrested at a roadblock for drunk 
driving. The Supreme Court of Kansas analyzed the case law and 
found that the Fourth Amendment required that a balancing test be 
applied to determine if a roadblock would qualify as an exception 
to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The court 
noted that the legitimate governmental interests must be balanced 
against the degree of intrusion resulting from the stop. In 
balancing these interests, the court relied on the three prong 
test described in Brown v. Texas, supra. The court then enumer-
ated thirteen factors and conditions that may play a part in the 
balancing test. The court stated: 
Among the factors which should be considered 
are: (1) The degree of discretion, if any, 
left to the officer in the field; (2) the 
location designated for the roadblock; (3) 
the time and duration of the roadblock; (4) 
standards set by superior officers; (5) 
advance notice to the public at large; (6) 
advance warning to the individual approaching 
motorist; (7) maintenance of safety condi-
tions; (8) degree of fear or anxiety generat-
ed by the mode of operation; (9) average 
length of time each motorist is detained; 
(10) physical factors surrounding the loca-
tion, type and method of operation; (11) the 
availability of less intrusive methods for 
combating the problem; (12) the degree of 
effectiveness of the procedure; and (13) any 
other relevant circumstances which might bear 
upon the test. Not all of the factors need 
to~be favorable to the state but all of which 
are applicable to a given roadblock should be 
considered. Some, of course, such as unbri-
dled discretion of the officer in the field, 
would run afoul of Prouse regardless of other 
favorable factors. 
State v. Deskins, supra at 1185. 
In this case, there was unbridled discretion left to 
the officers. Both Sergeant Mangelson and Howard testified that 
once a vehicle was stopped, it was up to the individual officer 
to decide what to do. (Tr. 25-30, 58-59) The only directions 
that were given to the officer were that they were to look for 
license and registration violations, liquor violations, drug 
violations and any other type of criminal violations. (Tr. 58) 
Howard testified that once a vehicle was stopped and a license 
and registration were produced, he had the discretion to let the 
vehicle go on its way or to further question the occupants. (Tr. 
28) Upon completion of such questioning, he then had complete 
discretion to determine if further investigation was necessary 
or if the motorist would be allowed to continue on his way. 
Trooper Howard also testified that the nature of the 
investigation was within his discretion. He could search the 
vehicle or person, or call the dispatcher to check for arrest 
warrants or stolen vehicle reports. (Tr. 25-30) 
The location of the roadblock was on Interstate 15. 
That is the major thoroughfare between Salt Lake City and south-
ern California. (Tr. 34) The roadblock was commenced at 7:00 
a.m. on Wednesday July 27, 1988. It ended at noon on that same 
date. (Tr. 6, 48) There was no evidence indicating why this 
particular location date or time was selected. There were no 
written standards established by superior officers and 
disseminated to those officers making the vehicle stops. (Tr. 61-
62) Mangelson testified that the only directions he gave to the 
officers were that they were to look for the various criminal 
violations previously described. (Tr. 22, 57) These 
directions were not given in any written form of briefing 
session. Most important, there were no directions given to the 
officers on what circumstances would require further 
investigation of a motorist once a driver's license and registra-
tion had been produced. 
As for the warning requirements described in Deskins, 
the general public was notified of the roadblock by publishing 
notice in the Juab County newspaper. This was done about two 
weeks before the roadblock. (Tr. 7, 33) Trooper Howard 
testified that the vast majority of the motorists that were 
stopped were from outside of Juab County. This included the 
appellant. The effectiveness of this notice was negligible 
because the roadblock was on a major interstate highway. 
The advance notice at the approach to the roadblock 
consisted of large orange signs that were about four feet square. 
(Tr. 49) The first sign had a picture of a flagman on it. (Tr. 
49, 65) That sign was located less than one-half mile from the 
roadblock. (Tr. 56) The next sign stated "Prepare to Stop". 
(Tr. 49, 57) The final sign indicated "All Vehicles Must Stop". 
(Tr. 49, 57) Several hundred feet beyond the last sign, a 
uniformed highway patrol trooper was signaling vehicles to pull 
over. (Tr. 49) Sergeant Mangelson testified that the signs 
were the same as those used at road construction areas. (Tr. 
55) None of the signs indicated that motorists were 
approaching a roadblock. (Tr. 56) Such signs failed to notify 
motorists of the pending intrusion. Furthermore, the speed limit 
in this area of the interstate is 65 miles per hour. (Tr. 21) 
At that speed, the location of the signs gave motorists less 
than thirty seconds notice of either the necessity to stop or the 
pending intrusion. 
With respect to safety conditions, the evidence 
indicated that motor homes and semi-tractors with trailers were 
waived through to avoid congestion at the roadblock, (Tr. 58) 
The degree of fear and anxiety generated by this roadblock had to 
be substantial. Travelers on the interstate freeway were 
subjected to a roadblock with little or no notice. Trooper 
Howard indicated that in addition to requesting the motorists' 
licenses and registrations, he would ask if they were in 
possession of any weapons, drugs or alcohol. (Tr. 30) Such a 
question would be very disconcerting to the average motorist. 
There was no indication that the purpose of the roadblock was 
explained to those people who were stopped. The roadblock 
created a great physical inconvenience just from being stopped 
on the freeway. It is also very likely that substantial fear and 
anxiety were created both from the stop and also from the nature 
of this questioning. 
The last factors described by the court in Deskins are 
similar to the three pronged test described in Brown v. Texas, 
supra. Those factors weigh heavily against the state and fail to 
justify this roadblock. The first prong of that test involves 
the weighing of the gravity of the public concerns. In this case 
Sergeant Mangelson testified that the purpose of the roadblock 
was to detect virtually all types of criminal activity. (Tr. 
50) There is no question that the public has a great concern in 
the detection of crime. However in City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 
110 Wash. 2d 454r 755 P.2d 775 (Wash. 1988), the Supreme Court of 
Washington was critical of asserting such a broad public interest 
in applying a balancing test to a roadblock issue. The court 
stated, "A fairer balance would weigh the actual expected 
alleviation of the social ills against the cumulated interests 
invaded". 755 P. 2d at 778. The court then suggested that 
alternative means of law enforcement that do not interfere with 
privacy interests be used. 
The second issue that must be addressed under Brown is 
the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest. 
The roadblock in this case is distinguishable from that described 
in Deskins, supra. There the roadblock was set up specifically 
to detect drunk drivers. It was placed at a location and at a 
time where there had been a history of drunk driving problems. 
In this case, the officers had multiple purposes for the road-
block. There was no indication why the particular time and 
location were selected. The only indication as to how this 
roadblock aided officers in detecting crime was that officers 
could stop vehicles that they would not otherwise be able to a 
stop without violating the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, the 
officers were not given any directions or procedures to be 
followed after a driver's license and registration were produced. 
The officers had unlimited discretion to release a driver, detain 
him for questioning, run a warrants check through the dispatcher, 
or request to search the vehicle, (Tr. 25-30, 58-59). 
The final issue to be addressed under Brown is the 
severity of the interference with individual liberty. This must 
be analyzed in terms of both the physical and psychological 
interference caused by the stop. Delaware v. Prouse, supra. 
The potential for great incovenience and extreme anxiety have 
been discussed at length with respect to the factors required by 
State v. Deskins, supra. 
In State v. Smith, supra, the Court of Criminal Appeals 
of Oklahoma discussed the test given in Brown v. Texas, supra, as 
it related to a roadblock established for the purpose of checking 
for individuals driving without a license. The court noted that 
the circumstances surrounding the roadblock indicated that its 
actual purpose was to detect drunk driving violations. With 
respect to the other two factors from Brown,the court stated: 
The Court finds such activites by law 
enforcement authorities, while commendable in 
their ultimate goal of removing DUI offenders 
from the public highways, draw dangerously 
close to what may be referred to as a police 
state. Here, the state agencies have ignored 
the presumption of innocence, assuming that 
criminal conduct must be occuring on the 
roads and highways, and have taken an "end 
justifies the means" approach. The Court is 
not so naive to think that criminal conduct 
does not occur regularly in the form of DUI 
offenders. Yet, a basic tenet of American 
jurisprudence is that the government cannot 
assume criminal conduct in effectuating a 
stop such as the one presented herein. Were 
-?£-
the authorities allowed to maintain such 
activities as presented in this caser the 
next logical step would be to allow similar 
stops for searching out other types of 
criminal offenders. 
674 P. 2d at 564. With respect to the case at bar, it is 
important to note that Sergeant Mangelson candidly admitted that 
the purpose of the roadblock was to look for any criminal 
violations in addition to various motor vehicle violations. (Tr. 
57) 
In Simmons v. Commonwealth, 380 S.E.2d 656 (Va. 1989), 
the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a D.U.I, roadblock 
violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court found that the only 
part of the roadblock plan that limited the officer's discretion 
was that all traffic was stopped. The Court found that to be an 
insufficient limit on discretion. The statute has no explicit 
plan or practice with respect to roadblock stops. Furthermore, 
the location and duration of the roadblock were within the 
discretion of the officers. That situation is indistinguishable 
from the case at bar. 
This case is also very similar to State ex rel Ekstrom 
v. Justice Court of State, 663 P.2d 992 (Ariz. 1983). In that 
case, a roadblock was established near Kingman, Arizona. A local 
Department of Public Safety lieutenant authorized the roadblock. 
The purpose of the roadblock was to enforce the state's drunk 
driving laws. The officers manning the roadblock were not 
instructed on the procedures to be used at the roadblock. There 
were no warning signs indicating that motorists would be 
subjected to a roadblock nor was there any advance notice 
published regarding the roadblock. The Arizona Supreme Court 
found that this particular roadblock did not meet the 
requirements of United States v. Briqnoni-Ponce, supra, or 
Delaware v. Prouse, supra. Consequently, it violated the Fourth 
Amendment. In so holding, the court stated, 
...we cannot agree that the intrusion gener-
ated by the Kingman roadblocks was minimal. 
The record established that the Kingman 
checkpoints involved a not insubstantial 
amount of discretionary law enforcement 
activity and that the manner in which the 
roadblocks were operated was somewhat irregu-
lar. The roadblocks were set up at the 
discretion of a local highway patrolman and 
were operated without specific directions or 
guidelines. Officers were uncertain whether 
they should simply question the occupants of 
motor vehicles or whether they should seize 
the^ opportunity to cursorily search the 
vehicles for evidence of a violation. Motor-
ists were taken by surprise, not having had 
prior notice of the location and purpose of 
the checkpoints. We find present in the 
Kingman operation the grave danger that such 
discretion might be abused by the officer in 
the field, a factor which caused the Court in 
[Delaware v.] Prouse, supra, much concern. 
623 P.2d at 996. 
In this case, a local lieutenant gave verbal 
authorization for the roadblock. (Tr. 55) The advance notice 
published in the Juab County newspaper would be ineffective in 
notifying interstate travelers of the roadblock. Likewise, the 
signs used at this roadblock were also ineffective in limiting 
the fear and anxiety caused by a roadblock. The signs did not 
indicate that motorists were being subjected to a detention at 
the hands of law enforcement agents. Finally, the officers were 
not given specific directions on how to conduct the roadblock. 
Thus, the officers had unfettered discretion in the manner in 
which the roadblock was conducted. Consequently, this roadblock 
did not meet the objective standards required by the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The stop of appellant's vehicle was unreasonable. The 
fruits of the search of that vehicle were seized in violation of 
his right to be free from warrantless and unreasonable searches 
and seizures as described in the Fourth Amendment. Those fruits 
must be ordered to be suppressed. Appellant's conviction should 
be reversed and a new trial ordered. 
CONCLUSION 
The roadblock stop of appellant's vehicle was done 
without a warrant and was unreasonable under both Article If 
Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah and the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. The proper remedy for this 
violation is the suppression of the evidence seized as a result 
of the stop. The critical evidence that was seized from 
appellant was the kilogram of cocaine. Since that was 
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This matter came before the Court on the 31st day of 
January, 1989 in Juab County, State of Utah, on the Motion of the 
Defendant to Suppress Evidence secured pursuant to the search of 
a vehicle he was driving when stopped at a road block in Juab 
County at approximately mile post 220- The State of Utah was 
represented by the Juab County Attorney, Donald Eyre, and the 
defendant by his counsel, G. Fred Metos. From the evidence 
presented the Court makes the following findings: 
1. Peace Officers representing the Juab County 
Sheriff's Office and the Utah Highway Patrol planned and executed 
a road block on July 27, 1988 al approximately 2 miles south of 
Nephi, on the north bound portion oT lnlcrslalc 15- Prior notice 
of the road block was given through media publication to the 
effect that all motor vehicles except semi-trucks would be 
stopped for drivers licenses, vehicle registration, and 
mechanical checks, commencing at 7:00 a.m. Ten to twelve 
officers participated at the site of the blockade where proper 
advanced signing was given to approaching vehicles. 
Participating law enforcement officers were in uniform and with 
patrol cars present. 
Sergeant Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol conducted 
a briefing prior to the road block of those participating wherein 
inquiry was first to be made of drivers licenses, and automobile 
registration, and that observations of the vehicles for equipment 
or alcohol violations including driving under the influence, and 
also for controlled substance violation. If no violations were 
apparent the vehicles were to be immediately released for 
continuation of travel. Citations or arrests were to be made for 
violations detected at the stop. 
The defendant, Louis E. Sims, vehicle was stopped at 
the road block at approximately 9:00 a.m. A trooper asked him 
for his registration and drivers license which were produced. 
The automobile was registered in Utah and the driver, Mr. Sims, 
had a Georgia drivers license. The officer detected a odor of 
alcohol, and observed an open container of alcohol in the rear of 
the car. The defendant denied the presence of weapons or 
contraband, but admitted the presence of alcohol in the vehicle. 
Upon request of the officer consent was obtained for the search 
of the vehicle- Sergearnt Mangelson assisted the trooper, Carl 
Howard, in the search. In addition to the open container of 
alcohol the search of the backseat revealed two marijuana joints 
in the back right hand side ashtray- The defendant voluntarily 
opened the trunk and Howard conducted a field sobriety test of 
him. Mangelson search the trunk and after discovery of 
additional marijuana the defendant exhibited nervousness and 
asked the officer to stop the search. Mangelson continued the 
search and in the tire compartment found a one kilogram brick of 
cocaine. 
Arrest was made of the defendant for driving under the 
influence and for controlled substance violations. 
Based on the foregoing findings of the court the first 
issue to be resolved is whether the road block stop of the 
defendant was a reasonable seizure, and not in violation of the 
defendant's Fourth Amendment Constitutional Rights. 
The only pertinent Utah authority in this area is the 
case of State of Utah v. Timothy Jo, case number 870537-CA, Utah 
Court of Appeals filed September 20, 1988. In that case a 
Sergeant Rudy Cook established a road block in San Juan County 
near Mexican Hat, approximately 100 feet from the entrance to the 
Navajo Indian Reservation in the early morning hours of March 29, 
1986. Cook received no prior authorizaLion from the sheriff's 
office nor did he receive any call back after having called in 
the road block that the operation was not authorized and he 
therefore proceeded. 
The road block was so located that there was 
surrounding light from commercial buildings and a street light 
together with police vehicles parked on both sides of the highway 
with flashing red spot lights activated as vehicles approached, 
these lights could be seen for two tenths of a mile. There were 
two officers and a civilian assisting Sergeant Cook who advised 
those assisting him to "check everyone as they come for regular 
traffic inspection, proper registration, proper drivers license-^ 
check for intoxicated people, open containers." 
The Court of Appeals cited Delaware v.Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648 (1979), where the United Supreme Court held that a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution occurs when 
police detain a motorist to check drivers license and 
registration without..."articulable and reasonable suspicion the 
motorist is unlicensed, the automobile is not registered, or that 
the vehicle or occupant may be seized for a violation of law." 
In a dicta the Supreme Court stated that the above 
holding does not deter a state..."from developing methods for 
spot checks that involve Jess intrusion or that do not involve 
the unconstitutional exercise of discretion Questioning of all 
oncoming traffic at road block-type stops is one possible 
alternative." The Court thus limited the decision to..."only 
that persons in automobiles on public highways may not for that 
reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the 
unbridled discretion of police officers," 
The facts in Timothy Jo were uncontroverted that two 
vehicles immediately preceding the defendant were allowed to 
pass through the blockade without being detained, and therefore 
that such unbridled discretion was volative of the defendant's 
Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure. 
Since the Prouse case the Circuit Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia in the case of United States of America 
vs. Gregory McFadden, was presented the same issue as is before 
this Court. Citing the Prouse case for the concept that stopping 
an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments even 
though the stop is limited and resulting detention quite brief. 
The Court in McFadden emphasized that "such seizures are 
unconstitutional, however, only if they are unreasonable." The 
Court went on to say that "in determining the reasonableness of a 
seizure a Court must balance the gravity of the public concerns 
served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances 
the public interest, and the severity of the interference with 
individual liberty." The Court went on to say that..."a seizure 
must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that 
societies legitimate interests require the seizure of the 
particular individual or.-."the seizure must be carried out 
pursuant to a plan embodying explicit neutral limitations on the 
conduct of individual officers." 
The Court in McFadden also cited United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, (1976), where the Supreme Court 
upheld the stopping of motor vehicles on a highway near Mexico 
for brief questions to determine whether illegal aliens were 
present. Noting that the check point where all vehicles were 
stopped was permanent and the degree of detention consistent with 
the Forth Amendment and did not require a warrant. The regular 
manner in which established check points are operated is visible 
evidence, reassuring to law abiding motorists that the stops are 
duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. Other 
authorities were cited wherein automobile road blocks held in a 
clearly visible check point where all vehicles were inspected for 
legal aliens, drivers license, vehicle registration, and proof of 
insurance, where the road block was "established in a systematic 
manner to stop vehicles in a pattern which protected the public 
from the officers unbridled discretion,..."past constitutional 
muster." The Court pointing out that a single officer stopping a 
car along a road to check drivers licenses, and registration 
because of suspicious conduct of watching officers through the 
rear view mirror, that such a search was unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment. The Court stating that "a roving police stop 
is a more serious intrusion than a predicted check point 
inspection, because the unexpected stop is pregnant with great 
annoyance and inconvenience, and more likely to frighten or 
embarrass." 
In sustaining the road block imposed the McFadden case 
the Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized that the road block was 
to regulate vehicular traffic by allowing the check of drivers 
license and vehicle registrations- And that the side effect of 
deterring drug sellers trafficking in areas where the road block 
was posted did not render the blockade unlawful. 
The fact that a history of escalating drug traffic 
along this stretch of Interstate 15 as a result of other arrests, 
tends to legitimize the public interest in predetermined check 
points, systematically pursued by officers to minimize the burden 
to individual citizens without discretion to engage in random 
roving stops. 
The Court concludes that the road block in question in 
this case was so planned and so executed as to render the 
inconvenience to the traveling public to be minimal, and so 
structured to neutralize the officers conducting the road block 
to a minimal intrusion on the traveling public's time and 
inconvenience. 
As to the conduct of the police officers after having 
affected a lawful stop the Court concludes that it became readily 
apparent to the officers senses that the defendant had been 
drinking, and as a result of that and of sobriety tests given 
him, he was charged with driving under the influence. Also, the 
officer noted an open alcohol container in the vehicle and 
obtained the consent from the driver to search the backseat where 
he found two marijuana roaches in the right rear cigarette tray, 
and asked the driver to open the trunk which he did. There is 
no evidence of coercion or duress to undermine the voluntary 
character of the consent given to the search of the car, 
including the trunk where marijuana was found. Thereafter the 
defendant withdrew his consent to continue the search, but the 
officer proceeded and found a kilo of cocaine in the spare tire 
well. The presence of the marijuana in the trunk compartment 
gave the officer reasonable cause to believe that additional 
contraband was probably present in the accessible areas of the 
trunk and which legitimized his search into the tire well where 
the cocaine was found. 
The Court concludes that all of the actions of the 
officers was legal and lawful and that the contraband obtained in 
admissible evidence in prosecutions for controlled substance 
violations and other violations detected and charged and a result 
of this stop. 
The Motion of the Defendant to Suppress the Evidence in 
this case is therefore denied. This matter is set for jury trial 
on the 28th day of March, 1989 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. in 
Nephi, Juab County, State of Utah. 
Dated this 2- ^ day of February, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
GEORGE £1 BALLIF, JUDGE/ 
cc: counsel 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LOUIE EDWIN SIMS, 
Defendant. 
******* 
Case Number 151-D 
GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE 
******** 
On or about the 24th day of February, 1989 this Court 
entered its ruling denying the motion of defendant to suppress 
evidence in this case claiming the same to have been secured as 
the result of an unlawful seizure of the defendant in violation 
of his constitutional rights. 
Defendant has moved the Court to reconsider its 
ruling..."for the reason that the Court failed to addressed the 
issue of the constitutionality of the stop of defendant's vehicle 
pursuant to Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah." 
The Court has reviewed the memorandum submitted by the 
TJS"fendant, and finds that it did not fail to consider the issue 
as to the broader protection afforded under the Utah Constitution 
to the personal rights protected by the Utah Constitution as 
opposed to Article 4 of the Federal Constitution and the 
application of federal law in the area of search and seizure. 
The Court refers counsel to the findings made by the 
Court with reference to the road block, the m.itL«.-r in which it 
was constituted, the notice given the public as to its operation 
on a given dayf the reasonableness of the detention provided and 
.he limitation on discretion of an officer to pick and choose 
amongst the traveling public as to who would be stopped and who 
allowed to past. 
The Timothy Joe case is factually distinguishable from 
the case of the United State of America vs. McFadden, and 
although there seems to be no other Utah case than Timothy Joe 
which has addressed the road block issue, McFadden, would seem to 
be within the scope of police activity which would be found not 
to violate Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah, and 
that the activities of the police in the case before the Court 
would be consistent with McFadden and found by the courts of this 
state not to constitute an unreasonable seizure of a defendant 
and incriminating evidence of a violation of law. 
The Court therefore again affirms its ruling as 
announced in the Ruling dated February 24, 1989 which denies the 
defendant's motion to suppress in this case. 
Dated this day of April, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
GEORGE E: BALLIF, JUI>dE 
cc: Donald Eyre 
Fred Metos 
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based on reasonable suspicion did not apply 
in determining whether suspicionless inves-
tigatory roadblocks were permissible. 
Const. Art. 1, § 14; U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amends. 4, 14; U.C.A.1953, 23-20-19, 27-
l(M(l)(b), 27-12-19, 41-l-17(c), 77-7-15. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 15, 1991. 
Defendant was convicted in the Fourth 
District Court, Juab County, George E. 
Ballif, J., of possession of a controlled sub-
stance with intent to distribute for value, 
and he appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Greenwood, J., held that: (1) roadblock at 
which defendant's vehicle was stopped vio-
lated both Fourth Amendment and Utah 
Constitution, and (2) defendant's consent to 
search his vehicle, made after vehicle was 
stopped at illegal roadblock, was arrived at 
by exploitation of roadblock, and was inval-
id. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Orme, J., filed specially concurring 
opinion. 
1. Criminal Law <8=»1031(1) 
Issue of whether roadblock conducted 
by police violated Federal and State Consti-
tutions was properly preserved for appeal, 
although State admitted that roadblock 
was unconstitutional for sake of argument, 
where defendant argued unconstitutionali-
ty of roadblock throughout proceeding and 
there was ample factual record from which 
issue could be assessed. Const. Art. 1, 
§ 14; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
2. Searches and Seizures <s=>18 
Roadblock or motorist "checkpoint" is 
"seizure" under Fourth Amendment and 
Utah Constitution. Const. Art. 1, § 14; 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Searches and Seizures s=>60 
Utah statutes governing vehicle in-
spections, regulation of traffic, and stops 
4. Searches and Seizures <s»60 
Suspicionless, investigatory roadblock 
in which vehicles and drivers were screened 
for possible violations of law violated 
Fourth Amendment; no explicit plan, be-
yond determination that all vehicles other 
than large trucks were to be stopped, gov-
erned roadblock, officers who authorized 
roadblock were not politically accountable 
officials, and there was no indication that 
authorization process involved balancing 
Fourth Amendment interests and law en-
forcement interest or assessment of effec-
tiveness of roadblock in meeting those in-
terests. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
5. Searches and Seizures <s=>ll, 23 
Fourth Amendment balancing test ap-
plies to warrantless seizures that, if not 
based upon articulable suspicion of individ-
ual, must be carried out pursuant to plan 
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on 
conduct of individual officers; additionally, 
such plan should be developed by politically 
accountable officials with unique under-
standing of and responsibility for, limited 
public resources, including finite number of 
police officers. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
6. Searches and Seizures <s=>60 
Politically accountable officials, not the 
courts, are responsible for performing ini-
tial balancing between Fourth Amendment 
and interests served by plan authorizing 
roadblock. U.S.C.A ConstAmend. 4. 
7. Searches and Seizures <s=60 
Suspicionless, investigatory motor ve-
hicle roadblocks, conducted without legisla-
tive authorization, are per se unconstitu-
tional under search and seizure provision of 
Utah Constitution. Const. Art. 1, § 14. 
8. Criminal Law <s=»394.6(2) 
Unless ground for suppression is un-
known or unavailable to defendant at time 
suppression motion is filed, right to chal-
lenge admission of evidence on that ground 
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is waived. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-12 (Re-
pealed). 
9. Criminal Law <S=>1031(1) 
Defendant's failure to argue at trial 
that there was insufficient attenuation be-
tween his consent to search of his automo-
bile and initial illegal stop of vehicle at 
roadblock did not preclude consideration of 
issue on appeal, where, because of then-
standing decisions effectively holding that 
noncoerced consent to search, by itself, 
purged the taint of primary illegality, 
nonattenuation argument was unavailable 
at tnal. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-12 (Repealed). 
10. Searches and Seizures <s=>184 
Defendant's consent to search of his 
vehicle, made after vehicle was stopped at 
illegal roadblock, was arrived at by exploi-
tation of roadblock, and was invalid; con-
sent was obtained within minutes of illegal 
stop, and defendant did not spontaneously 
volunteer his consent. Const. Art. 1, § 14; 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
G. Fred Metos (Argued), Yengich, Rich, 
Xaiz & Metos, Salt Lake City, for defen-
dant and appellant. 
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., Dan R. 
Larsen (Argued), Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. 
Before GREENWOOD, JACKSON and 
ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Louie Edwin Sims appeals his conviction 
of possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute for value, Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(i) (Supp.1988), a 
second degree felony. Sims claims the 
1. Sergeant Mangelson's efforts to thwart illegal 
drug trafficking are well known in Utah's appel-
late courts. See, e.g., Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (re-
versing State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah Ct. 
App.1989)); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 
1986); State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah Ct. 
App.1988); State v. Aquilar, 758 P.2d 457 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988). See also United States v. Corral, 
899 F.2d 991 (10th Cir.1990). Besides the 
present case, at least one other case involving 
an automobile search by Sergeant Mangelson is 
stop of his vehicle in a roadblock conducted 
by the Utah Highway Patrol was an unrea-
sonable seizure under the fourth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution and 
under article I, section 14 of the Utah Con-
stitution. 
Following oral argument, three cases rel-
evant to the issues presented in this appeal 
were decided. Those cases are Michigan 
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, — U.S. , 
110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990); 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990); 
and State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 
1990). Accordingly, we granted Sims' mo-
tion for supplemental briefing. Having 
considered the supplemental briefs, we now 
reverse his conviction, and remand for a 
new trial in which evidence seized from 
Sims' vehicle is to be suppressed. 
FACTS 
On the morning of July 27, 1988, officers 
from the Utah Highway Patrol and Juab 
County Sheriff's Office conducted a road-
block on Interstate Highway 15 approxi-
mately two miles south of Nephi, Utah. 
The roadblock was planned and supervised 
by Utah Highway Patrol Sergeant Paul 
Mangelson.1 Its purpose was to detect 
driver's license, automobile registration, 
and equipment violations, as well as liquor 
and drug violations. Notice that the road-
block would take place was published in the 
Juab County Times News two to four 
weeks prior to the roadblock. There was 
no evidence that the News was distributed 
outside of Juab County. Interstate 15 is a 
major north-south route and link between 
Salt Lake City, Utah and Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia. 
According to Mangelson, no written poli-
cy, from the Highway Patrol or from any 
pending in this court. State v. Kitchen, No. 
900307-CA. As a central player in at least five 
published search and seizure scenarios to date, 
the redoubtable trooper's notoriety is approach-
ing that of Max 25, a narcotics detection dog 
whose nose for crime has figured in at least 
seven published federal cases in the District of 
Columbia Circuit. See United States v. Colyer, 
878 F.2d 469, 471 and n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1989), and 
cases cited therein. 
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other source, existed to guide the conduct 
of the roadblock in question. Mangelson 
indicated that his supervising lieutenant 
had given him permission to conduct the 
roadblock. 
The roadblock was staffed by about ten 
uniformed officers. A series of three signs 
within a one-half mile distance directed 
drivers to the roadblock, marked by orange 
cones. Large trucks were not stopped, be-
cause stopping them might cause hazard-
ous traffic congestion. Sergeant Mangel-
son instructed officers to inspect driver's 
licenses and vehicle registration of the 
stopped motorists; while doing this, they 
were to watch for signs of liquor and drug 
violations. Officers could hold vehicles for 
further investigation if the initial contact 
raised questions. One of the officers, 
Trooper Carl Howard, indicated that his 
practice also included asking all drivers, 
regardless of suspicion, if they had alcohol, 
weapons, or contraband in their vehicles.2 
At approximately 9:00 a.m., Sims' ve-
hicle, a Chrysler sedan, was stopped at the 
roadblock. Trooper Howard, the first offi-
cer to contact Sims, saw nothing to cause 
him to suspect a violation of the law as 
Sims' vehicle approached.3 Howard asked 
for Sims' driver's license and vehicle regis-
tration. Sims produced a valid Georgia 
driver's license and a Utah registration in 
his name. In response to the trooper's 
question, Sims stated that he was en route 
from Los Angeles to Salt Lake City. While 
talking with Sims, Trooper Howard smelled 
alcohol inside the sedan and saw an "open" 
liquor bottle in the back seat area. He 
asked Sims if there were any alcohol, weap-
ons, or drugs in the vehicle. Sims admitted 
that there was alcohol in the vehicle, but 
denied carrying drugs or weapons. 
2. As indicated by the following exchange at the 
suppression hearing, an affirmative answer to 
this question could prompt Trooper Howard to 
then seek consent to search automobiles with-
out any other suspicion of wrongdoing: 
Q (Mr. Metos): Just out of curiosity, did 
anybody answer "yes" [to query about alco-
hol, weapons, or contraband] when every-
thing appeared in order so you would have to 
conduct a further search? 
Howard then asked Sims to exit the se-
dan, and asked for consent to look inside. 
Sims consented. Sergeant Mangelson ap-
proached and helped Howard search the 
car's interior. They discovered the rem-
nants of one or two marijuana cigarettes in 
the right rear passenger door ashtray. Ho-
ward then asked Sims if he would mind if 
they searched the trunk of the sedan. 
Sims agreed and opened the trunk. Man-
gelson searched the trunk while Howard 
conducted field sobriety tests on Sims near-
by. 
In a suitcase in the trunk, Mangelson 
discovered two small plastic bags contain-
ing marijuana. Sims, becoming visibly 
nervous, then stated that he wanted the 
search stopped. Mangelson told Sims that, 
based on the discovery of marijuana, he 
had probable cause to continue searching 
the trunk. Looking in the spare tire well, 
Mangelson found a kilogram brick of co-
caine. Sims was then arrested for driving 
under the influence of alcohol and posses-
sion of a controlled substance. 
Before trial, Sims filed a motion to sup-
press all evidence seized from his vehicle, 
contending that the roadblock stop was an 
unlawful seizure under the Utah and feder-
al constitutions and that the officers lacked 
probable cause to search the trunk. Fol-
lowing- an evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court denied Sims' motion. The court de-
termined that (1) the roadblock stop did not 
violate the Utah or federal constitutions; 
(2) Sims voluntarily consented to the search 
of the vehicle, including the trunk; and (3) 
Sergeant Mangelson had probable cause to 
continue searching the trunk after Sims' 
withdrawal of consent. Based on the evi-
dence presented at the suppression hearing 
and on the parties' written stipulation to 
the evidence, the trial court found Sims 
A (Trooper Howard): Yes. 
people do that. 
I've had several 
3. Re-cross examination of Trooper Howard by 
defense counsel included the following ex-
change: 
Q: You had no reason to believe [Sims] was 
doing anything wrong as he entered the road-
block or breaking any law; is that correct? 
A: That's correct. 
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guilty of possession of a controlled sub-
stance with intent to distribute. 
ISSUES 
On appeal, Sims argues that (1) the road-
block stop of his vehicle violated his right 
to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures under article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution and the fourth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution; 
and (2) there was insufficient attenuation 
between the unlawful detention and any 
consent to overcome the illegality of the 
roadblock. 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
ROADBLOCK 
Sims' first point on appeal deals solely 
with the permissibility _o£ the roadblock it-
self. Because it is undisputed that the 
roadblock was conducted with neither a 
warrant nor suspicion of wrongdoing by 
Sims, and that no emergency situation ne-
cessitated it, the question of whether the 
roadblock was improper is reduced to one 
of law, and we review it without deference 
to the trial court. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Serpente, 768 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah CtApp. 
"1989). 
The State neither contests nor accepts 
Sims' arguments that the roadblock violat-
ed the fourth amendment to the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 14 
of the Utah Constitution. Rather, the 
State invites us to decide this case solely on 
the basis of the attenuation issue. That is, 
we are to "assum[e] arguendo that the stop 
was illegal," and remand this case for fact 
finding on whether Sims' consent to search 
his vehicle was obtained through exploita-
tion of the stop. 
[1] We believe it inappropriate in this 
case, however, to simply assume that the 
roadblock was unconstitutional, without 
analysis. Sims has steadfastly and thor-
4. By thoroughly briefing state constitutional 
concerns in his argument, Sims has answered 
calls by Utah's appellate courts for a state con-
stitutional analysis of search and seizure issues. 
See, £.£., Earl, 716 P.2d at 805-06; State v. 
oughly argued the unconstitutionality of 
the roadblock, on both federal and state 
grounds, throughout these proceedings.4 
The transcript of the suppression hearing 
and the trial court's written findings on the 
issue provide an ample factual record from 
which we can assess the constitutionality 
of this roadblock. The issue, therefore, 
has been properly preserved and squarely 
presented on appeal. 
We are aware of the rule that we should 
avoid addressing constitutional issues un-
less required to do so. State v. Anderson, 
701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985). This 
roadblock, however, was not an isolated 
incident, and our police may continue to use 
suspicionless roadblocks as a law enforce-
ment tool.5 This makes all Utah motorists 
subject to closer police scrutiny than they 
might expect or, arguably, be legitimately 
required to encounter. 
[2] The right of citizens to be secure 
from unreasonable seizures "shall not be 
violated." U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah 
Const, art. I, § 14 (emphasis added). A 
roadblock or motorist''checkpoint" is a sei-
zure under the fourth amendment, Michi-
gan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, — U.S. 
, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2485, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 
(1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 
(Utah CtApp. 1990); there is no reason to 
hold otherwise with respect to our state 
constitution. For the benefit of our citi-
zens, as well as that of police charged with 
enforcing our laws, it behooves us to decide 
whether the roadblock that netted Sims 
was constitutionally permissible. We hold 
that it was not. 
Statutory Authority to Conduct Road-
blocks. 
[3] A prelude to the constitutional 
analysis per se is a determination of wheth-
er any statutory authority either permits or 
prohibits roadblocks of the sort conducted 
here, that is, a suspicionless, investigatory 
ro_adblock in which vehicles and drivers are 
Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425, 426 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App. 
1988) (citing cases). 
5. See, e.g., State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489 (Utah 
CtApp. 1990). 
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We note several statutes of interest, but 
none apply here. 
The Utah Department of Transportation 
operates ports of entry at which all large 
vehicles and vehicles transporting livestock 
are stopped and inspected for, among other 
things, driver qualifications, registration, 
tax payments, size and weight, and safety. 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-19 (Supp.1990). 
Our fish and game laws give the Division 
of Wildlife authority to conduct roadblocks 
or game checking stations under Utah 
Code Ann. § 23-20-19 (1984), which makes 
it unlawful to fail to stop at such stations. 
These provisions are obviously inapplicable 
here. 
We also note that the Utah Highway 
Patrol is charged with the duty of "regu-
lating] traffic on all highways and roads 
of the state." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 27-10-4(l)(b) (1989). This provision 
might authorize roadblock-type operations 
at, for example, accident scenes, or where 
hazardous road or traffic conditions require 
extra control. However, because this sec-
tion in no way implies authority to conduct 
investigatory operations, it does not apply 
here. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990) allows 
a peace officer to "stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable sus-
picion to believe he has committed or is in 
the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions."7 Similarly, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-l-17(c) (1988) requires officers to stop 
a vehicle for driver's license, registration, 
6. Under our characterization of this roadblock, 
it does not fit into the traditional "three levels" 
of police stops, that have been described as 
follows: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at [any 
time] and pose questions so long as the citizen 
is not detained against his will; (2) an officer 
may seize a person if the officer has an "artic-
ulable suspicion" that the person has commit-
ted or is about to commit a crime; however, 
the "detention must be temporary and last no 
longer than necessary to effectuate the pur-
pose of the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a 
suspect if the officer has probable cause to 
believe an offense has been committed or is 
being committed. 
upon reasonable 
belief that any vehicle is being operated in 
violation of any provision of this act or of 
any other law regulating the operation of 
vehicles " These codifications of the 
familiar "reasonable suspicion" standard of 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), were clearly not enact-
ed with roadblock-type stops in mind; rath-
er, they apply to the singling out of partic-
ular individuals or vehicles by the police, 
based on particularized suspicion. 
We find nothing in the Utah code that 
specifically prohibits the roadblock that 
was conducted here, however. Therefore, 
we query whether the roadblock was con-
stitutionally prohibited. 
Fourth Amendment 
[4] In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), 
the United States Supreme Court implied 
that roadblock stops for the purpose of 
checking driver's licenses and vehicle regis-
trations might be constitutionally permit-
ted. Holding that a routine stop of an 
individual vehicle for such purpose, without 
articulable individualized suspicion of 
wrongdoing, was impermissible under the 
fourth amendment, the Court commented 
that "[t]his holding does not preclude the 
State of Delaware or other States from 
developing methods for spot checks that 
involve less intrusion or that do not involve 
the unconstrained exercise of discretion. 
Questioning of all oncoming traffic a t road-
block-type stops is one possible alterna-
tive." Id. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401. 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 
1987) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. 
Memtt, 736 F.2d 223. 230 (5th Cir.1984), cert, 
denied, 476 U.S. 1142, 106 S.Ct. 2250, 90 L.Ed.2d 
696 (1986)). The level of individualized suspi-
cion, i.e., none, is the same as with a level one 
stop. However, since drivers were required to 
stop and had no opportunity to decline to par-
ticipate, the roadblock stop went well beyond a 
level one encounter. It did not, however, quali-
fy as a level two or three stop, since no individu-
alized suspicion prompted the stop. 
7. This provision has been characterized as a 
legislatively enacted version of the so-called lev-
el two stop. See State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 
541 (Utah Ct.App.1990); note 6 supra. 
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The Prouse dictum fell on receptive ears, 
and in Sitz, the Court considered an investi-
gatory roadblock, a "sobriety checkpoint," 
operated by the Michigan State Police De-
partment. The checkpoint was operated 
under guidelines created by a special state 
advisory committee composed of law en-
forcement officials and transportation j-e-
searchers from the University of Michigan. 
Those guidelines governed checkpoint pub-
licity, site selection, and police procedure at 
the checkpoint itself. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 
2483-84. 
Under the guidelines, all motorists trav-
eling through the checkpoint were stopped 
and briefly checked for intoxication. Only 
if the initial examination revealed signs of 
intoxication would a motorist would be di-
rected out of the traffic flow for a driver's 
license and registration check and further 
sobriety tests. The Sitz checkpoint was 
maintained for one hour and fifteen min-
utes. During that time, 126 vehicles were 
stopped for an average of twenty-five sec-
onds each. The checkpoint yielded two ar-
rests—approximately one and one-half per-
cent of stopped drivers—for driving under 
the influence. Id. at 2484. 
Utilizing a balancing test developed in 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 
(1976) and Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 
S Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), the Su-
preme Court held that Michigan's sobriety 
checkpoint passed fourth amendment mus-
ter. The brief detention of motorists at the 
checkpoint was found to be only a "slight" 
infringement of their fourth amendment 
interests. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2486. Out-
weighing this infringement were "the mag-
nitude of the drunken driving problem 
[and] the States' interest in eradicating it," 
id at 2485, along with the Court's assess-
ment that the one and one-half percent 
drunk driver arrest rate demonstrated that 
the checkpoint adequately advanced that 
interest. Id. at 2487-88; see also Brown, 
443 U.S. at 50-51, 99 S.Ct. at 2640 and 
cases cited therein (permissibility of non-ar-
8. The court's definition of the public interest 
pursued. i.e., detection of illegal drug traffick-
ing, appears to be contrary to testimony about 
the generalized purposes of the roadblock. 
rest seizure requires weighing public inter-
est served thereby, degree to which it 
serves the interest, and severity of interfer-
ence with individual liberty). 
According to the testimony of Sergeant 
Mangelson and Trooper Howard, the road-
block in the present case was of an "all-
purpose" variety. All vehicles except 
trucks were checked for licenses, registra-
tion, equipment problems, driver sobriety, 
and signs of illicit drugs, without any sus-
picion of wrongdoing. The trial court, fo-
cusing on the last purpose, performed a 
balancing test as described above. It held 
that "a history of escalating drug traffic 
along this stretch of Interstate 15 as a 
result of other arrests, tends to legitimize 
the public interest in predetermined check 
points, systematically pursued by officers 
to minimize the burden to individual citi-
zens without discretion to engage in ran-
dom roving stops."8 Without passing 
judgment on the accuracy of the trial 
court's balancing, we believe that analysis 
was premature and therefore erroneous. 
[5,6] As we read Sitz, Martinez-
Fuerte, and Brown, a fourth amendment 
balancing test applies to warrantless sei-
zures that, if not based upon articulable 
suspicion of an individuaJ=-^ jtttt$2 be carried 
out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, 
neutral limitations on the conduct of indi-
vidual officers." Brown, 443 U.S. at 51, 99 
S.Ct. at 2640 (emphasis added). Additional-
ly, such a plan should be developed by 
"politically accountable officials" with a 
"unique understanding of, and a responsi-
bility for, limited public resources, includ-
ing a finite number of police officers." 
Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2487. Those officials, and 
not the courts, are responsible for perform-
ing the initial balancing between the fourth 
amendment and the interests served by the 
plan. Id. While the Sitz sobriety check-
point met these requirements, the road-
block used here did not. 
No explicit plan, beyond a determination 
that all vehicles other than large trucks 
There was no finding as to the actual efficacy of 
the roadblock in meeting the public purposes 
described by the officers or the more specific 
purposes identified by the court. 
STATE v. SlMS 
Cite as 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991) 
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were to be stopped, governed this road-
block.9 Nor does it appear that Sergeant 
Mangelson or the lieutenant who gave him 
permission to conduct the roadblock are 
politically accountable officials as contem-
plated in Sitz.10 The process by which the 
roadblock was authorized also lacked fea-
tures of political accountability that were 
arguably present in Sitz: the Sitz road-
block was authorized pursuant to careful 
advance study that included non-police pub-
lic officials, while authority for this road-
block arose solely within a police agency. 
Finally, there is no indication that the au-
thorization process here involved any bal-
ancing of fourth amendment interests and 
law enforcement interests, or an assess-
ment of the effectiveness of the roadblock 
in meeting those interests. Instead, the 
lack of any written guidelines arising from 
the authorization process strongly sug-
gests that no such analysis took place. 
The requirement of explicit guidelines, 
developed in a politically accountable man-
ner that includes balancing of the relevant 
concerns, is, under Sitz, a prerequisite to 
any judicial balancing analysis of a suspi-
cionless roadblock. l] After-the-fact judicial 
balancing of the interests implicated by 
9. While we understand that allowing large 
trucks to bypass the roadblock may be neces-
sary for safetyJs sake, we wonder about the 
implications of this procedure for effective drug 
interdiction. The procedure seems to invite 
drug traffickers to transport their contraband in 
large trucks, and possibly relatively massive 
quantities, to avoid detection. 
10. Compare United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 
1389 (10th Cir.1987), upholding the constitution-
ality of a roadblock for the purpose of checking 
driver's licenses, vehicle registration, and insur-
ance, pursuant only to the permission of a state 
police supervisor. Corral does not cite Brown s 
requirement, adopted in Sitz, of a plan explicitly 
limiting officer discretion. In view of the reit-
eration of that requirement we find in Sitz. we 
do not accept Corrals implication that supervi-
sory permission to conduct a roadblock consti-
tutes an adequate "plan." 
Corral was cited in United States v. McFayden, 
865 F.2d 1306 (D.C.Cir.1989), which, in turn, 
was relied on by the trial court in holding the 
roadblock in this case constitutional. McFayden 
involved "traffic control" roadblocks set up to 
deal with traffic congestion associated with 
street level drug trafficking. The McFayden 
roadblocks were found to pass the reasonable-
ness balancing test of Brown. Those road-
such a roadblock cannot make it constitu-
tionally proper. Therefore, we hold that 
the roadblock in which Sims was detained 
violated the fourth amendment to the Unit-
ed States Constitution.12 
Utah Constitution Article /, Section 14. 
The Sitz emphasis on roadblock guide-
lines stresses the principle that when police 
operations interfere with fourth amend-
ment interests, "the discretion of the offi-
cial in the field [must] be circumscribed, at 
least to some extent." Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 
1400, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (citations omit-
ted). Sitz implicitly places both guideline 
development and the decision to utilize sus-
picionless roadblocks in the first place in 
the tends of "politically accountable" offi-
cials. We view roadblock authorization 
and guideline development as separate 
steps, however. The initial decision to per-
mit suspicionless roadblocks is especially 
critical, and requires a higher degree of 
political accountability than the guideline 
development step. Sims argues that the 
lack of statutory authority renders suspi-
cionless roadblocks improper under the 
blocks, again in contrast to the present situa-
tion, were carried out pursuant to a coordinated 
plan developed by five District of Columbia po-
lice districts. 
11. A similar conclusion might well be reached 
by viewing the roadblock as an "administrative 
search." Supreme Court cases dealing with 
such searches have focused on the balance be-
tween the need for such searches and the fourth 
amendment values implicated by such searches. 
However, the cases also involved situations 
where the challenged search was, at least argu-
ably, authorized by statute or ordinance. See 
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States. 397 
U.S. 72, 90 S.Ct. 774, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (fed-
eral statute); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 
U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) 
(city housing code); See v. City of Seattle, 387 
U.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967) 
(city building code). 
12. Our uncritical treatment of Sitz and other 
federal cases should not be taken as approval of 
the analysis employed, or result reached, in 
these cases. We merely accede to the preemi-
nent position of the United States Supreme 
Court in construing the United States Constitu-
tion. 
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Utah Constitution. As regards the initial 
authority to permit such roadblocks, we 
agree. 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitu-
tion is virtually identical to the fourth 
amendment. Like its federal counterpart, 
it consists of a "reasonableness" clause 
and a "warrant" clause: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures shall not be violated; and no war-
rant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, partic-
ularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
In State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 
1990), the Utah Supreme Court, decrying 
the United States Supreme CourtV4'vacilla-
tion between the warrant approach and the 
reasonableness approach" regarding auto-
mobile searches, id. at 469, reaffirmed its 
commitment to the warrant approach under 
our constitution, stating that "[warrant-
less searches and seizures are per se unrea-
sonable unless exigent circumstances re-
quire action before a warrant can be ob-
tained." Id. at 470 (quoting State v. Ckris-
tensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984)). 
In Larocco, a car theft suspect's expecta-
tion of privacy in the interior of the subject 
car, parked unattended and unlocked on a 
public street, triggered the application of 
article I, section 14. 794 P.2d at 468-69. 
Police officers' warrantless opening of the 
car's door to view the vehicle identification 
number on the doorjamb was found to con-
stitute1 a search subject to the fourth 
amendment's warrant requirement. The 
search was then held improper under arti-
cle I, section 14, because there was no 
threat that the car would disappear before 
13. Our analysis under the Utah Constitution is 
limited to the need for legislative authorization. 
We note, however, that Justice Durham's opin-
ion in Larocco, requires both probable cause 
and exigent circumstances to justify a warrant-
less search and seizure under article I, section 
14, which would seem to prohibit this roadblock 
and others. However, Larocco was a divided 
decision, with Justice Zimmerman concurring, 
Justice Stewart concurring in result only, and 
Justices Hall and Howe dissenting. The final 
a warrant could be obtained to look inside 
it. The court held that such "exigent cir-
cumstances" to support a warrantless 
search did not exist where the car was not 
en route away from the officers' jurisdic-
tion and the suspect had not been alerted to 
police interest in it. Id. at 470-71. 
Under article I, section 14 our supreme 
court applies a "warrants whenever possi-
ble" policy to motor vehicle searches and 
seizures. Id. This policy is consistent with 
one fundamental purpose of constitutional 
search and seizure limits: the interposition 
of neutral authority between police seeking 
evidence of crimes and the citizens from 
whom such evidence is sought.13 
In the usual non-exigent circumstances 
search and seizure scenario, the judicial 
branch, through a magistrate, serves as 
the neutral authority that issues or denies 
a warrant to perform a search or seizure. 
The warrant is issued only when probable 
cause exists. U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah 
Const, art. I, § 14. Our state legislature, 
however, has also served as a neutral au-
thority between our police and our citizens, 
in authorizing certain seizures upon less 
than probable cause. 
As already noted, our legislature has fol-
lowed the courts' lead in authorizing brief 
warrantless stops of individuals and motor 
vehicles based on reasonable suspicion.14 
Also as noted, the legislature has acted 
independently in authorizing ports of entry, 
as well as fish and game checkpoints. 
These operations, supported by neither 
warrants nor any level of individualized 
suspicion, clearly implicate article I, section 
14 of our constitution. 
From an operational standpoint, ports of 
entry and fish and game checkpoints close-
ly resemble the roadblock that was con-
verdict for Utah roadblocks is, therefore, un-
known. 
14. Arguably, legislative enactment of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 77-7-15 (1990) and 41-l-17(c) (1988) 
may reflect a determination by our legislature 
to not simply ratify judicial expansion of police 
power by silent acquiescence, but to determine 
through the political process whether such ex-
pansion is to become a part of Utah's law. 
STATE v. SIMS 
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ducted in this case, in that all large trucks, 
or all vehicles used by hunters, respective-
ly are submitted to official inspections. 
However, in authorizing these operations, 
our legislature has, presumably, weighed 
the need for such suspicionless inspections 
against their intrusion upon individual lib-
erty,15 a process analogous to that per-
formed by a magistrate in the issuance of a 
warrant. A high degree of political ac-
countability for the institution of these 
practices can also be presumed, in that 
representatives of truckers, hunters, law 
enforcement, and the citizenry at large all 
very likely played a part in passing the 
relevant statutes. 
In each case of legislation authorizing 
specific types of checkpoints or stops of 
persons or vehicles, with or without individ-
ualized suspicion of wrongdoing, the citi-
zens of this state have acted through their 
elected representatives. Therefore, the col-
lective will of the people is expressed and, 
furthermore, the people have notice of duly 
authorized police activity. 
In stark contrast, the roadblock conduct-
ed in this case was authorized solely by 
police officers, the very people whose be-
havior article I, section 14 is intended to 
limit. No non-law enforcement officials 
took part in the decision to set up the 
roadblock. Leaving the initial decision to 
conduct such operations in police hands ere-, 
ates a scheme that is both unrealistic and 
constitutionally untenable. 
[7] We believe that legislative authori-
zation of ports of entry and fish and game 
checkpoints, like the issuance of a judicial 
warrant, triggers at least some presump-
tion that these law enforcement practices 
are constitutionally permissible. Because 
the roadblock in this case had neither form 
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of authorization, it was entitled to no such 
presumption. Both warrants and statutes 
originate outside the executive branch, 
serving to check abuses of that branch's 
law enforcement power. Consistent with 
our supreme court's emphasis on the war-
rant requirement, then, we hold that suspi-
cionless, investigatory motor vehicle road-
blocks, conducted without legislative autho-
rization, are per se unconstitutional under 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitu-
tion. 
In requiring legislative authority as a 
prerequisite to the use of suspicionless in-
vestigatory roadblocks, we join two other 
western states that have similarly con-
strued their constitutions. See, e.g., State 
v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 
(1988); Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 
743 P.2d 692 (1987).16 At least one other 
state has established the same standard 
under the fourth amendment. State v. 
Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla.App.1984). This 
approach is particularly appropriate where 
a proposed police practice will, as here, 
affect everyone traveling our state's high-
ways. Because of its close ties to the 
citizens whose rights will be affected, the 
minimum necessary political accountability 
for such practices lies, at the outset, with 
our legislature. 
Our holding that article I, section 14 pro-
hibits suspicionless investigative road-
blocks without legislative authority, in ef-
fect, requires the legislature to perform the 
Sitz -type balancing function if and when it 
decides to consider the authorization of 
such roadblocks. Judicial balancing of the 
interests implicated by such roadblocks, 
then, will need to occur only if and when 
the legislature, upon performing such bal-
ancing itself, decides to authorize them.17 
15. Indeed, in the case of port of entry stops, the 
legislature appears to have weighed liberty con-
cerns with some care. Vehicles normally sub-
ject to these stops are exempted from stopping if 
doing so would increase their one-way trip dis-
tance by more than three miles or five percent. 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-19.4(1) and (3) (Supp. 
1990). 
16. In Pimental v. Dep't of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348 
(R.I.1989), and Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 348 
Pa^uper. 306, 502 A.2d 221 (1985), the Rhode 
Utah Rep 803-609 P 2d—13 
Island Supreme Court and the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania held sobriety checkpoints uncon-
stitutional under their state constitutions with-
out considering whether such practices could be 
valid if statutorily authorized. 
17. We note that the factors to be considered in 
performing such balancing are myriad, com-
plex, and subject to debate. See, e.g., Sitz and 
dissenting opinions of Brennan and Stevens, JJ.; 
Nelson v. Lane County, 743 P.2d at 710-11 (ap-
pendix); see also Davis & Wallentine, A Model 
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We, unlike our colleague in his concurring 
opinion, prefer that the legislature an-
nounce its view of public policy and the 
philosophy of Utah's citizenry as regards 
roadblocks, prior to the court applying con-
stitutional analysis to the legislature's 
product.18 
We also emphasize that our holding on 
the state constitutionality of the roadblock 
in which Sims was stopped is limited in its 
application to similar, non-emergency situa-
tions. It is not intended to apply to emer-
gency roadblocks that might, for example, 
be used to apprehend a fleeing felon. Nor 
do we intend to impede any existing au-
thority to conduct roadblocks for traffic 
control purposes. Any constitutional chal-
lenge to these types of traffic stops awaits 
another day. It is the suspicionless, inves-
tigative, non-emergency roadblock, con-
ducted in the absence of legislative authori-
ty, that we hold to be unconstitutional. 
ATTENUATION OF CONSENT FROM 
ILLEGAL ROADBLOCK 
Sims argues that there was insufficient 
attenuation between his detention and the 
consent he gave to search his vehicle to 
purge the taint of the illegality of the de-
tention. He does not claim that his consent 
was coerced from him and was therefore 
involuntary. Rather, he argues that be-
cause there were no intervening circum-
stances between the detention and the con-
sent, the consent was the fruit of the il-
legal detention, and, therefore, evidence 
seized pursuant to his consent should have 
been ordered suppressed. Sims did not 
make this argument in the trial court. 
[8,9] Normally, "where a defendant 
fails to assert a particular ground for sup-
pressing unlawfully obtained evidence in 
the trial court, an appellate court will not 
for Analyzing the Constitutionality of Sobriety 
Roadblock Stops in Utah, 3 B.Y.UJ.Pub.L. 357 
(1989). Political and economic considerations 
that are the particular province of the legisla-
ture may also come into play: Utah's economy 
benefits greatly from tourism, and the state is 
also currently attempting to attract the Winter 
Olympic Games. Our legislators may well wish 
to consider the possible impact of suspicionless 
roadblocks upon visitors to our state. 
I consider that ground on appeal." State v 
 Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985); see 
i also State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 71
 n< 2 
5 (Utah Ct.App.1990); Utah R.Crim.P. 12. 
Unless a ground for suppression is "u n . 
> known or unavailable" to a defendant at 
the time a suppression motion is filed, the 
i right to challenge the admission of evi-
; dence on that ground is waived. State v. 
\ Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 53 (Utah 1981). Here, 
however, because our then-standing deci-
sions effectively held that a non-coerced 
search consent, by itself, purged the taint 
of a primary illegality, Sims' non-attenua-
tion argument was unavailable to him in 
• the trial court and would have been point-
less to assert. See State v. Sierra, 754 
P.2d 972, 980 (Utah CtApp.1988). There-
fore, it is proper to address that argument 
now. 
In State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 
1990), the Utah Supreme Court, reversing 
this court's holding in State v. Arroyo, 770 
P.2d 153, 155-56 (Utah Ct.App.1989), held 
that, to be constitutionally valid, a search 
consent following illegal police behavior 
must be both non-coerced and not arrived 
at by exploitation of the primary police 
illegality. Factors used to evaluate the 
non-exploitation or attenuation element are 
derived from Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 
590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), 
which involved a confession obtained from 
a criminal suspect after his illegal arrest 
They include the temporal proximity of the 
primary illegality and the granting of con-
sent, the presence or absence of interven-
ing circumstances, and the purpose and 
flagrancy of the illegal police conduct. Ar-
royo, 796 P.2d at 690-91 n. 4 (citing 
Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. at 
2261-62, and 3 W. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 8.2(d), at 193-94 (2d ed. 1987)). 
18. It may be that lifestyle in the western states 
promotes a greater expectation of privacy in our 
automobiles than in other states or in the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court's enunciation of the 
"automobile exception" under the fourth 
amendment. See California v. Carney, 471 VS. 
386, 105 S.Ct. 2066. 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985). 
STATE v. SIMS 
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[10] The Arroyo case was remanded to 
the trial court for fact finding on the issue 
of whether the defendant's consent to 
search his vehicle was attenuated from or 
an exploitation of his illegal stop. Because 
the burden is on the State to show that 
evidence obtained following illegal police 
conduct is attenuated from the illegality, 
Broum, 422 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. at 2262, 
and because the attenuation issue was not 
presented to the trial court, a remand to 
examine the attenuation factors has been 
suggested here. We find, however, that 
the record now before us contains "suffi-
cient detail and depth" to allow us to deter-
mine the issue as a matter of law. See id. 
Regarding the temporal proximity factor, 
the record demonstrates a very short time 
span between Sims' stop in the roadblock 
and Trooper Howard's request to search 
his automobile. The trooper had but a 
brief conversation with Sims, regarding his 
license and registration, his trip itinerary, 
and possession of alcohol, guns, or contra-
band, before asking for consent to search 
his car. The consent was obtained within 
minutes of the illegal stop, and not even 
under our clear error standard of review 
could the trial court find enough time be-
tween the stop and the grant of consent to 
attenuate the relationship between the 
two.19 
Nor does the record reveal any possibili-
ty of intervening circumstances between 
the illegal stop and Sims' grant of consent 
to the search. Such circumstances must be 
independent of the primary illegality. Ar-
royo, 796 P.2d at 690-91. Here, Trooper 
Howard's request for consent to search 
Sims' sedan was based upon the smell of 
alcohol, the sight of the open liquor bottle 
in the sedan, and Sims' admission, une-
ventful since the bottle was in obvious 
view, that he was carrying alcohol. Ho-
ward's opportunity to make these observa-
19. We note that in Brown, an interval of less 
than two hours between an illegal arrest and the 
obtaining of an incriminating statement from 
the arrestee was viewed as insufficient to atten-
uate the statement from the arrest. 422 U.S. at 
604, 95 S.Ct. at 2262. 
20. Additionally, Trooper Howard testified that, 
once the open container was discovered, Sims 
tions and to question Sims, however, de-
pended entirely on the illegal roadblock. 
Neither Sims' driving nor the external ap-
pearance of his vehicle justified stopping 
him. Nothing occurred which could have 
reasonably made him feel free to proceed 
on his journey at any time between the 
moment of his stop and the discoveries that 
prompted the trooper's request for consent 
to search his vehicle.20 Sims did not spon-
taneously volunteer his consent, but gave it 
only when asked. Sims' consent, then, 
arose from an unbroken chain of events 
that began with the illegal roadblock. 
The final factor in the attenuation analy-
sis is an examination of the purpose and 
flagrancy of the primary police illegality. 
Here, this factor, unlike the first two, ap-
pears unrelated to the question of whether 
a search consent flowed from, i.e., was an 
exploitation of, the illegal police conduct.21 
Instead, it appears to be an alternative 
approach, inviting us to overlook unconsti-
tutional police conduct that serves good 
purposes and is not too flagrant. 
Troopers Howard and Mangelson testi-
fied at some length about their expertise in 
drug interdiction, and the trial court treat-
ed the roadblock as if that was its primary 
purpose. However noble this purpose 
might be, it was pursued by an unautho-
rized means. The troopers each had years 
of law enforcement experience, and can 
properly be charged with awareness that 
their action was not authorized by law. 
"The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in 
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, 
well-meaning but without understanding." 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 
479, 48 S.Ct. 564, 573, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Using ten to 
twelve law officers to staff the roadblock 
may have also left distant parts of the 
largely rural jurisdiction with delayed po-
lice assistance in the event of need. Thus, 
was, in fact, not free to leave, but was subject to 
citation and to field sobriety testing. 
21. By contrast, in Brown v. Illinois, the Supreme 
Court seems to have regarded an illegal arrest, 
that appeared "calculated to cause surprise, 
fright, and confusion," 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. 
at 2262, as a causative factor producing the 
arrestee's subsequent incriminating statements. 
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although it does not appear that the offi-
cers behaved abusively toward those 
stopped at the roadblock, this does not cor-
rect the constitutional violation. 
In sum, the record demonstrates that 
Sims' consent to search his vehicle was 
arrived at by exploitation of the illegal 
roadblock. Accordingly, that consent was 
invalid. Because the exclusionary rule ap-
plies to violations of both the fourth 
amendment and article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution, State v. Larocco, 794 
P.2d 460, 471-73 (Utah 1990), all evidence 
obtained under that consent must be sup-
pressed. 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
CONTINUE SEARCH 
Troopers Howard and Mangelson be-
lieved that the discovery of marijuana in 
Sims' sedan under the consent search gave 
them probable cause to continue searching 
after consent was withdrawn. However, 
because the initial consent was invalid, any 
probable cause found while searching un-
der that consent was also invalid. Absent 
probable cause to search the sedan without 
Sims' consent, we need not reach the issue 
of whether exigent circumstances existed 
to make the warrant requirement inapplica-
ble. 
CONCLUSION 
Sims' conviction for possession of a con-
trolled substance with intent to distribute 
is reversed, and the case is remanded to the 
trial court for proceedings in accord with 
this opinion. 
JACKSON, J., concurs. 
ORME, Judge (concurring specially): 
While I otherwise concur fully in the 
court's opinion, I have two difficulties with 
the discussion treating the roadblock under 
article I, section 14, of the Utah Constitu-
tion. First, if the roadblock cannot even be 
validated under the questionable "bal-
ancing" approach of Michigan v. Sitz, — 
U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 
(1990), see, e.g., id. at 2490-99 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting), we have no need to examine 
whether it might be additionally invalid un-
der the state constitution. Second, and 
more importantly, I am not enthusiastic 
about suggesting that the legislature, any 
more than the courts or the police, should 
be about the business of balancing away 
important constitutional protections that 
safeguard all of us so that law enforce-
ment can more readily catch an occasional 
law-breaker. The citizen's right to be free 
from police intrusion in the total absence of 
even the least suspicion of wrong-doing 
should simply not be at the mercy of the 
legislature's determination of how tourism 
or our hopes for the Olympics might some-
how be adversely impacted by one law en-
forcement technique or another. 
If it were necessary to reach the state 
constitutional issue in this case, i.e., if the 
roadblock passed muster under the federal 
constitution, I would be more inclined to 
solidify long-standing constitutional pre-
cepts as at the core of article I, section 14, 
than to borrow the troublesome "bal-
ancing" approach embraced in Sitz, adopt 
some variation of that approach, and begin 
a journey down that nebulous path. Cf. 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah 
1990) (state constitutional analysis em-
ployed "to simplify . . . the search and sei-
zure rules so that they can be more easily 
followed by the police and the courts and, 
at the same time, provide the public with 
consistent and predictable protection 
against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures"). I would probably prefer to hold 
that the rule of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), uni-
formly applied by Utah courts, is a matter 
of Utah constitutional law that simply may 
not be balanced away by any branch of our 
government and that is not amenable to a 
roadblock exception. 
Under established Utah decisional law, in 
the absence of any individualized suspicion, 
only a level one stop is permitted. E.g., 
State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 766 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990); State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 
537, 570 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Tru-
jillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87-88 (Utah CtApp. 
1987). A level one stop is a purely volun-
tary encounter. Id. And one does not lose 
GOTTFREDSON v. UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BD. Utah 153 
Ctte as 808 P.2d 153 (Utah App. 1991) 
the right to decline to participate in a level 
one encounter simply because one chooses 
to drive rather than to walk. See State v. 
Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah CtApp. 
1989); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 328 
(Utah CtApp. 1989), rev'd on other 
grounds, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991). See 
also, Delaware v. Prowse, 440 U.S. 648, 
663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 
(1979) (persons do not lose the protections 
of fourth amendment "when they step 
from the sidewalk into their automobiles"); 
State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491, 494 
(Utah CtApp. 1990). 
If, as seems clear, the police cannot re-
quire every pedestrian on a stretch of side-
walk to stop and answer police inquiries, I 
am hard-pressed to see how they can stop 
every car on a stretch of the interstate 
highway and require the driver to answer 
inquiries. In my view, the only roadblock 
that is sure to pass state constitutional 
muster is one which would qualify as a 
level-one stop. Cf. Little v. State, 300 Md. 
485, 479 A.2d 903, 906 (1989) (roadblock 
upheld where motorists avoiding roadblock 
or otherwise refusing to cooperate not de-
tained). I see no constitutional problem 
with a roadside police checkpoint an-
nounced by a sign on the freeway, "Police 
Roadblock Next Exit. Your Cooperation in 
Answering Police Inquiries Appreciated." 
Most drivers would stop, even though they 
could not be required to, just as most pe-
destrians will stop and respond to police 
inquiries on the sidewalk. But on neither 
medium of travel can one suspected of 
nothing illegal whatsoever be compelled to 
do so. 
(o f HYNUMMRSYSTEM> 
Burt A. GOTTFREDSON, Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT 
BOARD, Respondent. 
No. 900255-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 20, 1991. 
Worker's petition to withdraw his re-
tirement application was denied by the 
State Retirement Board, and worker ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Garff, J., 
held that: (1) worker's request to cancel his 
application was untimely, and (2) Board had 
no affirmative duty to inform worker of 
proposed legislation which, if passed, could 
substantially affect his benefits. 
Affirmed. 
Law and Procedure 1. Administrative 
<s=*800 
Standard of review on appeal from fi-
nal agency action dealing with statutory 
interpretation presents issue of law, and 
Court of Appeals therefore applies correc-
tion-of-error standard, in which it extends 
no deference to agency's conclusions. 
2. States <s=>64.1(3) 
Where worker established on his re-
tirement application his retirement date, 
which date also determined when his bene-
fits would start to accrue, no alteration, 
addition, or cancellation of his benefits 
could be made after that date; thus, be-
cause his request to cancel his application 
was not made until after that date, his 
request was properly refused. U.C.A.1953, 
49-1-603(1). 
3. States ®=>64.1(3) 
Retirement Board had no affirmative 
duty to inform worker, who had filed his 
retirement application, of proposed legisla-
tion which, if passed, could substantially 
affect his benefits. U.C.A.1953, 49-1-
603(1). 
SIMS v. STATE TAX COMMISSION 
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Louie E. SIMS, Petitioner, 
v. 
COLLECTION DIVISION OF the UTAH 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent 
No. 900324. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 22, 1992. 
Driver sought review of order of state 
Tax Commission affirming a tax and penal-
ty assessment under the Illegal Drug 
Stamp Tax Act The Supreme Court, Dur-
ham, J., held that: (1) authority for a suspi-
cionless investigatory roadblock could not 
be implied from the broad statutory author-
ity of police to preserve the peace and to 
make all lawful arrests; (2) driver's con-
sent to a search of his automobile and 
trunk did not purge evidence of the taint of 
illegality after driver had been stopped by 
an unconstitutional roadblock and police 
had discovered cocaine and marijuana dur-
ing search; and (3) civil tax proceeding 
would be characterized as quasi-criminal so 
thaf the exclusionary rule would apply to 
exclude illegally obtained evidence from 
the drug stamp proceedings. 
Reversed. 
Stewart, J., filed opinion concurring in 
the result 
Howe, Associate CJ., filed dissenting 
opinion in which Hall, CJ., concurred. 
1. Arrest «=*3.5(6) 
Authority for suspicionless investigato-
ry roadblocks could not be implied from 
broad statutory authority of police to pre-
serve peace and make all lawful arrests, 
even though express statutory authority 
existed for roadblocks for traffic control 
purposes, for port of entry purposes, and 
to enforce fish and game laws. (Per Dur-
ham, J., with one Justice concurring and 
one Justice concurring in the result) Const 
Art 1, § 14; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4; 
U.C.A.1953, 10-3-914, 17-22-2, 23-20-19, 
27-12-19, 77-23-101 to 77-2&-105. 
2. Searches and Seizures <s=>182 
Factors to determine whether consent 
to search is lawfully obtained following 
initial misconduct are whether consent was 
voluntary and whether consent was ob-
tained by exploitation of prior illegality. 
(Per Durham, J., with one Justice concur-
ring and one Justice concurring in the re-
sult) Const Art 1, § 14; U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 4. 
3. Searches and Seizures s=>182 
Factors to be considered in determin-
ing whether primary illegality of ^arch is 
exploited to obtain consent are, temporal 
proximity of illegal seizure and consent, 
presence of intervening circumstances, pur-
pose and iflagrancy of official misconduct, 
whether illegal seizure brought about po-
lice observation of particular object they 
sought consent to search, whether consent 
was volunteered rather than requested by 
detaining officers, whether party searched 
was made aware of ability to refuse con-
sent and prevent immediate search, and 
whether police purpose underlying illegali-
ty was to obtain consent (Per Durham, J., 
with one Justice concurring and one Justice 
concurring in the result) Const. Art. 1, 
§ 14; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
4. Searches and Seizures <s=>182 
Driver's consent to search of automo-
bile and trunk did not purge evidence of 
taint of illegality after driver was stopped 
by unconstitutional suspicionless investiga-
tory roadblock and police discovered co-
caine and marijuana during search; offi-
cer's request for consent was based upon 
observations that were direct result of ille-
gal stop, consent was closely related in 
time to initial stop with no intervening cir-
cumstances, and driver was not told that he 
could decline to consent. (Per Durham, J., 
with one Justice concurring and one Justice 
concurring in the result.) Const. Art. 1, 
§ 14; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
5. Taxation e=>845 
Civil proceeding under Illegal Drug 
Stamp Tax Act should be characterized as 
quasi-criminal so that exclusionary rule ap-
plies to exclude illegally obtained evidence; 
SIMS v. STATE TAX COM'N 
O t e u M l Md 6 (Utah 1992) 
Utah 7 
statute seeks to punish and deter those in 
possession of illegal drugs, enforcement is 
inextricably connected with proof of crimi-
nal activity by requiring possessors of ille-
gal drugs to purchase drug stamps and 
affix them to drugs, and application of 
exclusionary rule should provide deterrent 
to unconstitutional seizures by law enforce-
ment entities who receive money collected 
under statute. (Per Durham, J., with one 
Justice concurring and one Justice concur-
ring in the result) U.C.A.1953, 59-19-101 
to 5&-19-107, 59-19-105(1), (6), (6)(a)(ii), 59-
19-106(1); Omst Art 1, § 14. 
6. Evidence <$=>154 
Illegally seized evidence must be ex-
cluded under State Constitution if proceed-
ing in which exclusion is sought is quasi-
criminal in nature or if there is particular-
ized need for deterrence to restrain improp-
er law enforcement activities, despite 
whether proceeding in question is labeled 
civil or criminal in nature. (Per Durham, 
J., with one Justice concurring and one 
Justice concurring in the result.) Const. 
Art. 1, § 14. 
R. Paul Van Dam, Leon A. Dever, John 
C. McCarrey, Salt Lake City, for Tax 
Com'n. 
G. Fred Metos, Salt Lake City, for Sims. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Petitioner Louie E. Sims seeks review of 
a formal order of the Utah State Tax Com-
mission ("the Commission") affirming a tax 
and penalty assessment under the Illegal 
Drug Stamp Tax Act ("the Act"). Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 5^-19-101 to -107. We re-
verse the decision of the Commission and 
vacate the tax and penalty assessed. 
On July 27, 1988, the Utah Highway 
Patrol and the Juab County Sheriffs De-
partment set up a roadblock on Interstate 
Highway 15 approximately two miles out-
side of Nephi, Utah. When Sims' car was 
stopped at the roadblock, the officers ob-
served an open container of alcohol in the 
back seat area. Sims was asked to exit the 
car, at which time he consented to a search 
of the interior. There, the officers discov-
ered the remnants of one or two marijuana 
cigarettes. Sims then consented to a 
search of the trunk. When the latter 
search revealed two small plastic bags con-
taining marijuana, Sims stated that he 
wanted the search stopped. Asserting that 
they had probable cause to continue, the 
officers inspected the spare tire well, un-
covering a kilogram brick of cocaine. Sims 
was then arrested for driving under the 
influence of alcohol and possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distrib-
ute. 
Under the Act, anyone who purchases, 
acquires, transports, or imports illegal 
drugs into the state must pay a tax and 
affix drug tax stamps to the drugs. Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-19-105(1). The required 
stamps were not attached to or contained 
with the cocaine and marijuana found in 
Sims' car. On August 30, 1988, Sims was 
served with a notice and demand for pay-
ment of an illegal drug stamp tax and a 
corresponding penalty. The tax, assessed 
pursuant to section 59-19-103 of the Act, 
and the penalty, under section 59-19-106(1) 
of the Act, total almost $400,000. 
Upon being served with notice of the tax 
and penalty, Sims filed a petition for rede-
termination with the Commission. He ar-
gued, among other things, that the road-
block stop was an unconstitutional seizure 
and that the evidence seized pursuant to it 
should, under the exclusionary rule, be ex-
cluded from the tax proceeding. Because 
the Commission held that the exclusionary 
rule does not apply to proceedings under 
the Act, it did not reach the question of 
whether the roadblock stop was constitu-
tional. The State did not address the issue 
of the constitutionality of the roadblock 
stop in either its brief to the Commission or 
its brief to this court. Rather, the State 
asks us to decide the case solely on the 
basis of the exclusionary rule. 
We believe that it would be irresponsible 
for us to simply assume that the roadblock 
was unconstitutional without analysis. 
Sims has preserved the issue on appeal, 
and although the Utah Court of Appeals 
has addressed the question of suspicionless 
roadblock stops a number of times, see 
SMS v, STATE TAX CORTN 
CtteasMl TOd 6 (Utah 1992) 
Utah 9 
ized suspicion of wrongdoing to establish 
probable cause, and because roadblocks are 
planned in advance, no exigent circum-
stances justify an immediate search. The 
requirement that a disinterested party re-
view and approve the need to search was 
designed to prevent arbitrary and oppres-
sive interference with individual privacy 
and personal security and to guarantee 
that a decision to search private property is 
justified by a reasonable governmental in-
terest Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 
387 U.S. 523, 528, 539, 87 S.Ct 1727, 1730, 
1736, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). 
The State argues in this case that suspi-
cionless investigatory roadblocks are au-
thorized by statute. We do not reach the 
question of whether such statutory authori-
zation could constitutionally be accom-
plished by the legislature, because we con-
clude that no such authorization has been 
attempted. 
Although certain roadblocks are autho-
rized by statute,4 at the time of the search 
in question Utah law did not expressly au-
thorize suspicionless investigatory road-
blocks.8 A number of statutory provisions 
grant law enforcement agencies and offi-
4. There is statutory authorization to stop and 
inspect all large vehicles and vehicles transport-
ing livestock at ports of entry for, among other 
things, dnver qualifications, registration, tax 
payments, size and weight, and safety. Utah 
Code Ann. § 27-12-19. Moreover, the Division 
of Wildlife is given authority to conduct road-
blocks to enforce the fish and game laws. Id. 
§ 25-20-19. 
5. We note, however, that in 1992 the legislature 
authorized the use of administrative traffic 
checkpoints under prescribed circumstances. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23-101 to -105. 
*• Sheriffs and their deputies are granted author-
ity to preserve the peace and make all lawful 
arrests. Utah Code Ann. § 17-22-2. Municipal 
police officers are granted authority "at all 
times to preserve the public peace, prevent 
Crime, detect and arrest offenders, . . . protect 
persons and property, remove nuisances exist-
ing in the public streets, roads and highways, 
enforce every law relating to the suppression of 
offenses and perform all duties required of 
them by ordinance or resolution." Id. § 10-3-
914. 
7. On this point, we agree with the following 
statement of the Oregon Supreme Court 
*[S]ome procedures may invade the personal 
cers general police powers to provide for 
public safety and welfare.* Other states 
have inferred legislative authority to con-
duct roadblocks from such statutory grants 
of general police powers. See, e.g.t People 
v. Estrada, 68 Ill.App.3d 272, 24 Ill.Dec. 
924, 929-30, 386 N.E.2d 128, 133-54, cert 
denied, 444 U.S. 968, 100 S.Ct 459, 62 
L.Ed.2d 382 (1979). Because of the prima-
cy in Utah of the warrant requirement and 
the grave potential for injury to individu-
als' constitutional interests, however, we 
decline to infer authority for suspicionless 
investigatory stops from broad statutory 
directives.7 No authority to conduct suspi-
cionless investigatory roadblocks of the 
type conducted here exists; hence, then-
use is patently unlawful. Whether consti-
tutionally sufficient standards and guide-
lines could be incorporated in statutory 
form is a question we leave for future 
consideration. 
[2,3] In conjunction with the question 
of the legality of the roadblock in this case, 
we must address the question of whether 
Sims' subsequent consent to a search of his 
car alleviates the taint of the prior illegal 
seizure.8 In State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 
freedoms protected from government interfer-
ence by the constitution. Roadblocks are sei-
zures of the person, possibly to be followed by a 
search of the person or the person's effects. For 
this reason, the authority to conduct roadblocks 
cannot be implied." Nelson v. Lane County, 304 
Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692, 695 (1987); accord State v. 
Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988); 
State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 
(Okla.Crim.App.1984). Moreover, in the exist-
ing statutes, the Utah Legislature has provided 
that suspicion of wrongdoing is a condition pre-
cedent for authority to stop a person or vehicle. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-105(8)(b), 77-7-15. 
This serves as additional support for our rejec-
uon of implicit statutory authority for mvestiga-
tory suspicioniess roadblocks. 
8. Two factors determine whether a consent to 
search is lawfully obtained following initial mis-
conduct: (1) whether the consent was volun-
tary, and (2) whether the consent was obtained 
by exploitation of the prior illegality. State v. 
Arroyo, 796 P^d 684, 688 (Utah 1990). Here, 
there is no allegation that the consent was 
coerced from Sims or that it was otherwise 
obtained involuntarily. Our discussion focuses, 
therefore, on the second factor, whether the 
prior illegality was exploited to obtain the con-
cededly voluntary consent. 
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Commission), or essentially coextensive. 
See Ex Parte Caffie, 516 So.2d 831, 837 
(Ala.1987) (exclusionary rule inapplicable in 
probation revocation hearing under both 
federal and state constitutions because 
state constitution "protects similar, if not 
identical, interests" to Fourth Amendment 
of United States Constitution). Only a few 
states have analyzed the scope of the rule 
separate and apart from the federal consti-
tution and federal case law. 
Developments in Oregon suggest that its 
exclusionary rule applies to civil as well as 
criminal proceedings. Several recent cases 
have characterized the purpose of the Ore-
gon exclusionary rule as restoring a defen-
dant's personal right rather than as deter-
ring unlawful police conduct State v. 
Tanner, 304 Or. 312, 745 P.2d 757, 758 
(1987); State v. Davis, 295 Or. 227, 666 
P.2d 802, 809 (1983); see also Ronald W. 
Messerly, Development in the Law, Devel-
opment of the Right to Exclude Illegally 
Seized Evidence in Oregon under Article 
I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution, 25 
Willamette LRev. 697, 709 n. 82 (1989). 
Another scholar has argued that a per se 
application of the exclusionary rule might 
be appropriate under the Oregon Constitu-
tion regardless of the nature (civil or crimi-
nal) of the proceeding in which the illegally 
seized evidence is sought to be admitted. 
See H. Lee Cook, Comment, The Oregon 
Variation of the Fourth Amendment Ex-
clusionary Rule in Administrative Pro-
ceedings, 65 Or.L.Rev. 681, 683 (1986). 
In 1982, the voters of California added 
section 28(d) to article I of the California 
Constitution, providing that relevant evi-
dence shall not be excluded from any crim-
inal proceeding. Subsequently, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court ruled that evidence 
must still be excluded as required by the 
12. At first, the California court extended the 
exclusionary rule to forfeiture proceedings, rea-
soning that they were criminal in nature. See 
People v. One I960 Cadillac Coupe, 62 Cai2d 92, 
41 CaLRptr. 290, 293. 396 P.2d 706, 709 (1964). 
In People v. Moore, 69 CaUd 674, 72 CaLRptr. 
800, 805, 446 P.2d 800, 805 (1968), overruled on 
other grounds, People v. Thomas, 19 Cal3d 630, 
139 CalJRptr. 594, 600 n. 8, 566 P.2d 228, 234 n. 
8 (1977), the court held that evidence illegally 
seized under the Fourth Amendment was inad-
federal constitution and, moreover, that the 
constitutional amendment did not affect the 
precedent in that state regarding the appli-
cability of the exclusionary rule to certain 
civil proceedings. In re Lance W., 37 
Cal.3d 873, 210 CaLRptr. 631, 643-44, 694 
P.2d 744, 75G-57 (1985)." The Lance court 
considered the applicability of the rule to 
civil proceedings in terms of the state con-
stitution, reaching the conclusion that un-
der the California Constitution, the exclu-
sionary rule extends only to quasi-criminal 
proceedings, not to other civil proceedings. 
Id 210 CaLRptr. at 643, 694 P.2d at 756; 
accord Governing Bd, v. Metcalf 36 Cal. 
App.3d 546, 111 CaLRptr. 724 (1974) (evi-
dence of lewd acts by a schoolteacher ob-
tained in violation of California and federal 
constitutions admissible in administrative 
hearing to revoke teaching license). 
In Whisenhunt v. State, 746 P.2d 1298 
(Alaska 1987), the Alaska Supreme Court 
extended the application of the exclusion-
ary rule to a civil license revocation pro-
ceeding. It is not entirely clear from the 
opinion whether the Alaska court based its 
decision exclusively on state law or on both 
federal and state law. In addition to con-
sidering the federally accepted policy of 
deterrence, the Alaska court relied on its 
own state policy of "fundamental fair-
ness." Id. at 1300. Because this is not a 
policy relied on by the federal courts when 
applying the exclusionary rule to noncrimi-
nal proceedings, it is reasonable to con-
clude that the Alaska court was articulat-
ing state law. 
This court first addressed the question of 
a state exclusionary rule in Larocco, where 
we expressly held that "the exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence is a necessary 
consequence of police violations of article I, 
section 14" of the Utah Constitution. 794 
missible in a civil proceeding to commit a nar-
cotic addict because that proceeding was quasi-
criminal in nature. Later, the court declined to 
extend the exclusionary rule to parole revoca-
tion proceedings, In re Martinez. 1 Cal.3d 641, 
83 CaLRptr. 382, 388, 463 P.2d 734, 740 cert 
denied sub nom. Martinez v. Craven, 400 VS. 
851,91 S.O. 71, 27 L.Ed.2d 88 (1970), or to state 
bar proceedings, Emslie v. State Bar, 11 Cal.3d 
210, 113 CaLRptr. 175, 186, 520 P.2d 991, 1002 
(1974). 
SIMS v. STA1 
QuuMl PJ 
TJ2A at 472. In Larocco, the warrantless 
opening of an unlocked car door to inspect 
a vehicle identification number was held to 
constitute an unreasonable search under 
that provision of our state constitution. 
We held that the trial court had incorrectly 
admitted evidence of the vehicle identifica-
tion number in a criminal trial for car theft. 
The Larocco decision expressly reserved 
the question of the nature and scope of the 
exclusionary rule under the state constitu-
tion, holding only that it exists. Id at 473. 
We now extend the state exclusionary rule 
to proceedings under the Illegal Drug 
Stamp Tax Act, based on the reasoning 
that illegally obtained evidence should be 
excluded from a civil proceeding if the pro-
ceeding is in effect criminal or if the exclu-
sion is necessary to deter future unconsti-
tutional searches. Our treatment of the 
exclusionary rule in this case is based sole-
ly on state law. Federal law cited is relied 
upon only for its persuasive value. 
Because of the difference in potential 
penalties, the criminal defendant is often 
afforded greater protection than the civil 
defendant. See generally United States v. 
One Assortment of Firearms, 465 U.S. 
354, 358-59, 104 S.Ct 1099, 1103, 79 
L.Ed.2d 361 (1S84) (based on difference in 
relative burdens of proof in criminal and 
civil actions, neither collateral estoppel nor 
double jeopardy bars a civil remedial forfei-
ture proceeding initiated following acquit-
tal on related criminal charges). Where 
the aims and objectives of a civil penalty 
are closely aligned with those of the crimi-
nal law, however, the protections afforded 
by the criminal law ought to be extended to 
the quasi-criminal proceeding. For this 
reason, the United States Supreme Court 
interpreted the federal exclusionary rule to 
include forfeiture proceedings in One 1958 
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 
U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 
(1965), stating, "[A] forfeiture proceeding 
is quasi-criminal in character. Its object, 
like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for 
the commission of an offense against the 
law." Id. at 700, 85 S.Ct at 1250. 
: TAX COM*N Utah 13 
6 (Utah 1992) 
Although forfeiture proceedings are fre-
quently cited as the prototype, other kinds 
of civil proceedings have been character-
ized as quasi-criminal. See Powell v. Zuc-
kert, 366 F.2d 634, 640 (D.C.Cir.1966) (em-
ployee discharge hearing); Iowa v. Union 
Aspfralt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F.Supp. 391, 
407 (S.D.Iowa 1968) (antitrust proceeding), 
affd as to exclusionary rule issue sub 
nom Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 
1171 (8th Cir.1969); United States v. 
Blank, 261 F.Supp. 180, 184 (N.D.Ohio 
1966) (wagering excise tax assessment pro-
ceeding); Rinderknecht v. Maricopa 
County Employees Merit Sys., 21 Ariz. 
App. 419, 520 P.2d 332, 334-35 (employee 
discharge hearing), vacated after settle-
ment, 111 Ariz. 174, 526 P.2d 713 (1974); 
People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 800, 805, 446 P.2d 800, 805 (1968) 
(proceeding to commit narcotic addict), 
overruled on other grounds, People v. 
Thomas, 19 Cal.3d 630, 139 Cal.Rptr. 594, 
600 n. 8, 566 P.2d 228, 234 n. 8 (1977); 
Finns Liquor Shop, Inc. v. State Liquor 
Authority, 2A N.Y.2d 647, 301 N.Y.S.2d 
584, 588, 249 N.E.2d 440, 443 (administra-
tive proceedings to suspend or cancel liquor 
licenses), cert denied, 396 U.S. 840, 90 
S.Ct 103, 24 L.Ed.2d 91 (1969). The civil 
tax proceeding at issue in this case should 
be included in that group. 
The Act at issue in this case is similar to 
the criminal law in its objectives. It seeks 
to punish and deter those in possession of 
illegal drugs. Cf. Deeter v. Smith, 106 
Wash.2d 376, 721 P.2d 519, 520-21 (1986) 
(forfeiture proceedings brought pursuant 
to the state's Uniform Controlled Sub-
stances Act "are quasi-criminal in nature 
since their purpose is to penalize individu-
als who participate in the illegal transporta-
tion of controlled substances"). The Com-
mission asserts that the objective of the 
Act is to raise revenue, but the assessment 
scheme and penalty provisions are far too 
onerous to justify such a conclusion.18 The 
fact that section 59-19-106(1) requires 
those who violate the Act to pay a 100 
percent penalty in addition to the base tax 
reveals that one objective of the Act is to 
13. The tax and penalty assessed against Sims in this case, for example, total almost $400,000. 
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punish and deter those in possession of 
illegal drugs. The fact that the legislature 
has chosen to obtain this result by what it 
terms a "tax" and a "penalty" does not 
change the character of the result 
The quasi-criminal nature of the tax pro-
ceeding in this case is further evidenced by 
the fact that enforcement of the Act i§ 
inextricably connected with proof of crimi-
nal activity. See Kuntz v. State Highway 
Comm'r, 405 N.W.2d 285, 289 (N.D.1987) 
("[T]he civil and criminal consequences [of 
a refusal to take an intoxilyzer test] are so 
intermingled that they are not perceptibly 
different to a lay person."). Violation of 
the Act necessarily involves criminal con-
duct and a violation of criminal law. Com-
pliance with the Act presupposes the pos-
sessor's knowledge of the possession of 
illegal drugs and therefore requires a viola-
tion of criminal law.14 "It would be anoma-
lous indeed, under these circumstances, to 
hold that in the criminal proceeding the 
illegally seized evidence is excludable, 
while in the [civil] proceeding, requiring the 
determination that the criminal law has 
been violated, the same evidence would be 
admissible." Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 
701, 85JS.Ct at 1251. Given that an essen-
tial element of a criminal offense must be 
established by either violation of or compli-
ance with the Act, we are convinced that 
enforcement proceedings under the Act 
must be viewed as quasi-criminal and the 
exclusionary rule should therefore apply. 
One of the frequently cited purposes of 
the exclusionary rule is to deter future 
14. In order to comply with the Act, those in 
possession of illegal drugs must purchase Utah 
Drug Stamps and "affix the official indicia [the 
drug stamps] on the . . . controlled substances 
evidencing the payment of the tax required un-
der this chapter." * Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-
105(1). 
15. In its brief, the State argues that because 
section 59-19-105(6) did not become effective 
until April 24, 1989, we should not consider its 
effect on Sims' case. While it is true that the 
amendment was not effective on July 27, 1988, 
when the cocaine and marijuana were seized, 
nor on August 29, 1988, when the tax and penal-
ty became due and payable, the language of the 
statute does not necessarily lead to the conclu-
sion, as the State would assert, that any monies 
eventually paid in this case will not be shared 
unlawful seizures. See, e.g., United States 
v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446, 96 S.Ct 3021, 
3028, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046, reh'g denied, 429 
U.S. 874, 97 S.Ct 196, 60 L.Ed.2d 158 
(1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 
U.S. 338, 347, 94 S.Ct 613, 619, 38 L.Ed.2d 
561 (1974); Cqffie, 516 So.2d at 832; Pul-
lin, 484 So.2d at 107. In addition to the 
general need for protection of individual 
rights under article I, section 14, there is a 
specialized need for ensuring restraint by 
law enforcement officials in connection 
with the Act Law enforcement entities 
have a particularized interest in the use of 
the illegally obtained evidence in the civil 
tax proceeding under section 59-19-
105(6XaXii). That section provides that 60 
percent of the taxes, interest, and penalties 
collected are to be distributed "to the law 
enforcement agency conducting the con-
trolled substance investigation, to be used 
and applied by the agency in the continued 
enforcement of controlled substance laws." 
Id. In view of the financial motivation 
given to local law enforcement agencies to 
acquire evidence of tax violations, the appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule to drug 
stamp tax proceedings is likely to provide a 
significant and substantial additional deter-
rent to unconstitutional seizures.15 This is 
a second and independent reason to apply 
the exclusionary rule to proceedings under 
the Act 
[6] We hold that illegally seized evi-
dence must be excluded under article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution where 
the proceeding in which exclusion is sought 
with law enforcement agencies. The language 
of the statute, rather, provides for a sharing of 
the amounts "collected" under the Act. This 
language implies that such a division might oc-
cur on amounts which are assessed prior to the 
effective date of the amendment but are not 
collected until after that time. 
Moreover, deterrence is by definition the dis-
couragement or prevention of future acts. Our 
application of the exclusionary rule in this case 
obviously cannot deter any unconstitutional sei-
zures that have already occurred. Our purpose 
in citing a deterrence rationale is with regard to 
future activity. The applicability or inapplica-
bility of section 59-19-105(6) to the specific 
facts of this case is therefore not particularly 
relevant 
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is quasi-criminal in nature or where there is 
a particularized need for deterrence to re-
strain improper law enforcement activities. 
This result shall ensue whether the pro-
ceeding in question is labelled "civil" or 
"criminal/' Both conditions apply in this 
case, and we therefore hold that the exclu-
sionary rule applies to proceedings under 
the Utah Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act We 
reverse the judgment of the Commission 
and vacate the tax and penalty assessed 
against Sims. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., concurs. 
STEWART, Justice (concurring in the 
result): 
I concur in the result reached in Justice 
Durham's opinion. I write separately be-
cause I think it essential to observe that 
her sweeping opinion represents the -views 
of only two justices of this Court and is 
therefore not the law of the state. I also 
write because her opinion raises more diffi-
cult issues than it settles with respect to 
the legality of roadblocks. While I would 
prefer not to address the legality of the 
roadblock, I do so briefly to point out that 
the result of this case is dictated by federal 
law. 
As Justice Durham's opinion demon-
strates, the Tax Commission proceeding 
that adjudicated petitioner's tax liability 
under the Utah Illegal Drug Stamp Tax 
Act was quasi-criminal in nature. The pri-
mary purpose of that Act is to penalize, not 
to raise revenue. In effect, the Act impos-
es criminal penalties for the possession of 
illegal drugs. 
The United States Supreme Court held in 
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylva-
nia, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 
170 (1965), that the Search and Seizure 
Clause of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and the exclu-
l. Justice Howe contends in his dissenting opin-
ion that under United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 
433, 96 S.O. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976), the 
proceeding before the Tax Commission was not 
quasi-criminal in nature. I disagree. The hold-
ing in Janis turned on the issue of whether 
evidence illegally seized by state officers should 
be suppressed in a federal action to assess wa-
gering taxes. The Court held that the Fourth 
sionary rule apply to quasHniminal pro-
ceedings. Because the instant case in-
volves a quasi-criminal proceeding and be-
cause the Tax Commission concedes on ap-
peal that the roadblock was illegal, it fol-
lows that the evidence seized as a result of 
the roadblock must be suppressed under 
federal law. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); see 
also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 
S.Ct. 1623,10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963); James v. 
Louisiana, 382 U.S. 36, 86 S.Ct 151, 15 
L.Ed.2d 30 (1965) (per curiam).1 
Notwithstanding the Tax Commission's 
concession that the roadblock was illegal, 
Justice Durham asserts that it would be 
"irresponsible" to assume the illegality of 
the roadblock. She does not explain, and I 
do not see, why that is so. Issues are 
frequently conceded for purposes of deci-
sion. It is therefore sufficient to hold that 
federal law requires suppression of the ille-
gally seized evidence in this case. Never-
theless, Justice Durham undertakes an ex-
tensive analysis of search and seizure law 
for the benefit of "the lower courts, coun-
sel, and law enforcement officers general-
ly." She concludes that the roadblock was 
illegal under Utah constitutional law. That 
conclusion, however, is dictum. 
I would hold the roadblock illegal under 
federal law because of the complete lack of 
protection against unbridled police discre-
tion as to how, when, under what circum-
stances, in what manner, and for what pur-
pose roadblocks may be used. See Michi-
gan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 
444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990). 
The authority to establish roadblocks to 
stop automobiles pursuant to wholly arbi-
trary discretion is fundamentally contrary 
to the privacy interests protected by the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
Amendment did not require the suppression of 
illegally seized evidence in a federal proceeding 
where the evidence had been seized by state, not 
federal, law enforcement officers. The Court 
reasoned that the exclusion of that evidence in a 
federal proceeding would not serve to deter 
unlawful state police conduct Id at 454, 96 
S.Ct. at 3032. 
16 Utah 841 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Justice Durham's reliance on, and refer-
ence to, State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 
(Utah 1990), raises difficult problems and 
settles nothing. Although Larocco is cited 
repeatedly, it did not represent the views of 
a majority of this Court Moreover, I do 
not now, and did not in Larocco, under-
stand what Justice Durham means when 
she refers to "this court's commitment to 
the warrant approach under our state con-
stitution." I agree that warrants are a 
highly important element of search and 
seizure law, but insofar as the "warrant 
approach" is intended to be something dif-
ferent from the "federal approach," I do 
not know what the warrant approach is, 
and Larocco does not elucidate that point. 
On its facts, Larocco was nothing more 
than a disagreement with federal search 
and seizure law on a comparatively periph-
eral aspect 
Now, Justice Durham states that "war-
rantless searches of automobiles will be 
allowed only if probable cause and exigent 
circumstances exist" She then states that 
in the case of a "suspicionless investigatory 
roadblock, neither the first nor the second 
prong of the warrant requirement is met" 
Those statements taken together would 
make all preplanned, suspicionless road-
blocks illegal, including roadblocks intend-
ed to remove intoxicated drivers from the 
highways or to enforce automobile safety 
measures. Although at one point Justice 
Durham seems to arbitrarily exempt statu-
torily authorized roadblocks from those 
constitutional requirements, she does not 
explain that point 
I also disavow any conclusion that might 
be drawn from Justice Durham's opinion 
that the exclusionary rule should be applied 
in civil cases generally, as opposed to qua-
si-criminal cases that are technically civil in 
nature. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice 
(dissenting): 
I find it unnecessary to determine wheth-
er the roadblock and Sims' subsequent con-
sent to the search were invalid. Assuming 
that to be true, I cannot agree that evi-
dence seized from Sims' automobile in vio-
lation of article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution is inadmissible in a proceeding 
before the Tax Commission under the Utah 
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act The majority 
extends the state exclusionary rule to pro-
ceedings under the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax 
Act, based on the reasoning that illegally 
obtained evidence should be excluded from 
a civil proceeding (1) if the proceeding is in 
effect criminal or (2) if the exclusion is 
necessary to deter future unconstitutional 
searches. In my opinion, neither of those 
two reasons supports the exclusion of the 
evidence in the instant case. 
The state exclusionary rule came into 
existence on the vote of a majority of this 
court in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 
(Utah 1990) (Justice Durham wrote for the 
court, Justice Zimmerman concurred, and 
Justice Stewart concurred in the result). 
Chief Justice Hall and this writer dissented 
from the application of the rule to the facts 
of that case. Subsequently, in State v. 
Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), this 
court applied the rule to exclude bank rec-
ords of a criminal defendant (Justice 
Stewart dissented.) As the majority opin-
ion in the instant case points out, the Lar-
occo decision expressly reserved the ques-
tion of the nature and scope of the exclu-
sionary rule under the Utah Constitution, 
holding only that it exists. When and un-
der what conditions it is to be applied was 
left to be determined in future cases. In 
view of that reservation, I deem it very 
important in the instant case that we not 
extend the rule further than the reasoning 
and purpose upon which it rests. 
The majority opinion correctly notes that 
in recent years there has been a trend in 
federal courts to limit the application of the 
federal exclusionary rule. See United 
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 96 S.Ct 3021, 
49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976), for a discussion of 
the criticism which has been leveled at that 
rule by writers and jurists. Indeed, Justice 
Blackmun observed that the evolution of 
the exclusionary rule has been marked by 
sharp divisions in the Supreme Court 
Janis, 428 U.S. at 446, 96 S.Ct at 3028, 49 
L.Ed.2d at 1056. I therefore believe that 
we should exercise caution in extending the 
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exclusionary rule to civil cases, particularly 
where it will have no deterrent effect 
The majority opinion observes that only a 
few state courts have explicitly considered 
the question of whether their state exclu-
sionary rule extends to civil proceedings. 
Of those few courts, most have not applied 
it to civil proceedings. The majority sug-
gests that only in Oregon, where the pur-
pose of the state exclusionary rule has 
been characterized as the restoration of a 
defendant's personal right rather than the 
deterrence of unlawful police conduct, and 
Alaska, where a state policy of "fundamen-
tal fairness" was recognized, has the rule 
been invoked in civil proceedings. There is 
no counterpart right or policy in Utah. 
I 
I cannot agree with the majority that 
civil proceedings under the Utah Illegal 
Drug Stamp Tax Act are in effect criminal 
and thus the exclusionary rule should ap-
ply. The majority relies upon One 1958 
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 
U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 
(1965), where the Supreme Court applied 
the rule in a proceeding for forfeiture of an 
article used in violation of the criminal law. 
The Court held that the forfeiture proceed-
ing was quasfcriminal in character. How-
ever, the instant case is not a forfeiture 
proceeding, but a civil tax liability proceed-
ing before the Tax Commission. A subse-
quent case, United States v. Janis, 428 
U.S. 433, 447, 96 S.Ct 3021, 3028-29, 49 
LEd.2d 1046, 1056-57 (1976) (not cited in 
the majority opinion), severely limited One 
1958 Plymouth Sedan to its facts. The 
Court held that evidence unlawfully seized 
by local police officers investigating local 
wagering offenses was not barred from 
use in a subsequent federal civil tax pro-
ceeding. The Court left open the issue of 
whether the exclusionary rule should be 
applied in a civil proceeding involving an 
intrasovereign violation, i.e., where the 
agency that effected the unlawful arrest 
was responsible for instituting the subse-
quent civil action. Later, in Immigration 
and Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Men-
doza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S.Ct 3479, 82 
UlahR«p 836-641 P.2d—17 
L.Ed.2d 778 (1984) (discussed infra in part 
II), the Court refused to apply the exclu-
sionary rule even though there had been an 
intrasovereign violation. It is significant 
that in Janis, the Court could have decided 
the case on the ground that the civil tax 
proceeding brought there to collect taxes 
on illegal wagering was quasi-criminal in 
nature. But it did not do so. Instead, the 
Janis Court acknowledged One 1958 Plym-
outh Sedan in a footnote but distinguished 
it on the ground that the forfeiture of 
items used in the commission of a crime is 
"clearly a penalty for the criminal of-
fense." Janis, 428 U.S. at 447 n. 17, 96 
S.Ct at 3029 n. 17, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1057 n. 
17. The Court noted that it had "never 
applied the exclusionary rule to exclude 
evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or 
state." Janis, 428 U.S. at 447, 96 S.Ct at 
3029, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1057. To this day, the 
Supreme Court has not held that a tax 
collection proceeding was quasi-criminal in 
nature and applied the exclusionary rule 
under One 1958 Plymouth Sedan. 
Forfeiture proceedings are therefore 
unique in their status as quasi-criminal, 
and such status should not be extended to 
civil tax proceedings. Governments levy 
taxes on a variety of legal activities as well 
as illegal activities. The nature of the pro-
ceeding to impose taxes does not change 
when the activity taxed is illegal. Indeed, 
the Internal Revenue Code imposes taxes 
on bootlegging, gambling, extortion, and 
fraud. The majority attempts to draw 
strength for its position by referring to the 
100 percent penalty imposed upon violators 
of the Illegal Drug Tax Stamp Act How-
ever, although heavy penalties are custom-
arily found in federal and state tax law, no 
court has held or suggested that the impo-
sition of heavy penalties transforms a tax 
collection proceeding into a quasi-criminal 
proceeding. The taxpayer may feel that he 
or she is being punished, but the exclusion-
ary rule should not be used to remedy 
unjust taxation. The legislature, in enact-
ing the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, clearly 
intended for the 100 percent penalty to be a 
civil penalty. It is assessed and collected 
as part of the tax. The Act does, however, 
impose a criminal penalty in addition. A 
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dealer distributing or possessing drugs 
without affixing the appropriate stamps is 
guilty of a third degree felony and is sub-
ject to a fine of not more than $10,000. 
Thus, the legislature prescribed separate 
civil and criminal penalties, which distinc-
tion we should observe. 
The majority opinion concedes that for-
feiture proceedings are frequently cited as 
the prototype of quasi-criminaLproceadings 
but states that "other kinds of civil pro-
ceedings" have been characterized as qua-
si-criminal. However, none of the cases 
cited and relied upon by the majority as 
being quasi-criminal are civil tax proceed-
ings except United States v. Blank, 261 
F.Supp. 180 (N.D.Ohio 1966). Blank was 
decided years before Janis clearly limited 
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan to forfeiture 
proceedings. Thus, it is clear that Blank is 
not good law in light of the subsequent 
case of Janis. The Second Circuit, in lira-
do v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 
1982), noted that "in a handful of cases" 
decided just after the Supreme Court's ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule to forfei-
ture proceedings in One 1958 Plymouth 
Sedan, a few courts applied the exclusion-
ary rule in civil proceedings by analogy to 
criminal proceedings. Tirado, 689 F.2d at 
311 n. 5. "These cases stretched the 'qua-
si-criminal' rationale used in the forfeiture 
cases to reach" certain civil proceedings, 
wrote the Second Circuit. Id. Among the 
cases referred to are Blank and Powell v. 
Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634 (D.C.Cir.1966). 
Those two cases and Iowa v. Union As-
phalt and Road Oils, Inc., 281 F.Supp. 391 
(S.D.Iowa 1968), which are all relied upon 
in the majority opinion, were decided after 
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan but before its 
application was severely limited by Janis. 
Thus, their value as precedent is questiona-
ble. 
The reasoning of the majority is that this 
tax proceeding is quasi-criminal and that 
Sims should be accorded the benefit of the 
exclusionary rule, which was developed to 
be applied in criminal cases. Perhaps, 
then, other rights accorded a criminal de-
fendant should be extended to Sims as well. 
The Tax Commission would then be trans-
formed into a criminal tribunal under which 
Sims ought to have the right to a jury trial, 
the right to counsel, and other protections 
afforded to an accused. Such a conclusion 
would be impractical and absurd. 
II 
The second reason offered in the majori-
ty opinion for applying the exclusionary 
rule in this case, i.e., to deter future unlaw-
ful seizures, is misplaced. The exclusion-
ary rule is a creature of federal case law. 
In that body of law, it has been consistent-
ly held that the exclusionary rule is "a 
judicially created remedy designed to safe-
guard fourth amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect, rather than a 
personal constitutional right of the party 
aggrieved." United States v. Janis, 428 
U.S. 433, 446, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3028, 49 
L.Ed.2d 1046, 1056 (1976) (quoting United 
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 
S.Ct. 613, 620, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974)). 
Since it is a remedy and not a right, "appli-
cation of the rule has been restricted to 
those areas where its remedial objectives 
are thought most efficaciously served." 
Id. 428 U.S. at 447, 96 S.Ct. at 3028, 49 
L.Ed.2d at 1056-57 (quoting Calandra, 414 
U.S. at 348, 94 S.Ct. at 620). The exclu-
sionary rule is strong medicine which pre-
vents the enforcement of admittedly valid 
laws and should be taken no more often 
than is necessary to "combat the disease." 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 487 n. 24, 96 
S.Ct. 3037, 3049 n. 24, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 n. 
24, 1083-84 n. 24 (1976) (quoting Amster-
dam, Search, Seizure, and section 2255: A 
Comment, 112 U.Pa.L.Rev. 378, 388-89 
(1964)); see also Janis, 428 U.S. at 447, 
454, 96 S.Ct at 3028-29, 3032, 49 L.Ed.2d 
at 1056-57, lOBO^r -~T*e pllttie, if not the 
sole, purpose of the exclusionary rule is to 
"deter future unlawful police conduct." 
Janis, 428 U.S. at 446, 96 S.Ct. at 3028, 49 
L.Ed.2d at 1056 (quoting Calandra, 414 
U.S. at 347, 94 S.Ct. at 619). Indeed, one 
reason the exclusionary rule is generally 
not applicable in civil cases is that the 
parties .to the action did not control the 
search and application of the rule would 
not discourage the parties from searching 
unlawfully. 
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The Supreme Court in Janis outlined a 
framework for deciding the type of pro-
ceeding in which application of the exclu-
sionary rule is appropriate. 428 U.S. at 
448-54, 96 S.Ct at 3029-82, 49 L.Ed.2d at 
1057-61. The Court stated that the likely 
social benefits of excluding unlawfully 
seized evidence should be weighed against 
the likely costs. On the benefit side of the 
balance, the prime purpose of the rule is to 
deter future unlawful police conduct On 
the cost side, there is the loss of often 
probative evidence, which may result in a 
wrongdoer's going unpunished. Subse-
quently, in Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 
1032, 104 S.Ct 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984), 
the Court summarized why it had refused 
to apply the exclusionary rule in Janis, 
which was a civil proceeding to impose and 
collect taxes on illegal bookmaking: 
Two factors in Janis suggested that the 
deterrence value of the exclusionary rule 
in the context of that case was slight. 
First, the state law enforcement officials 
were already "punished" by the exclu-
sion of the evidence in the state criminal 
trial as a result of the same conduct 
Second, the evidence was also excludable 
in any federal criminal trial that might 
be held. Both factors suggested that 
further application of the exclusionary 
rule in the federal civil proceeding would 
contribute little more to the deterrence 
of unlawful conduct by state officials. 
On the cost side of the balance, Janis 
focused simply on the loss of "conceded-
ly relevant and reliable evidence." The 
Court concluded that, on balance, this 
cost outweighed the likely social benefits 
achievable through application of the ex-
clusionary rule in the federal civil pro-
ceeding. 
Id 468 U.S. at 1042, 104 S.Ct. at 3485, 82 
L.Ed.2d at 788 (quoting Janis, 428 U.S. 
433, 447-48, 96 S.Ct at 3029). 
In refusing to apply the exclusionary 
rule in the tax proceedings in Janis, the 
Court properly noted: 
There comes a point at which courts, 
consistent with their duty to administer 
the law, cannot continue to create barri-
ers to law enforcement in the pursuit of 
a supervisory role that is properly the 
duty of the Executive and Legislative 
branches. 
Janis, 428 U.S. at 459, 96 S.Ct at 3034, 49 
L.Ed.2d at 1064. 
In Lopez-Mendoza, the Court declined to 
apply the exclusionary rule in a civil depor-
tation hearing where an alien admitted his 
unlawful presence in this country after an 
allegedly unlawful arrest by INS agents, 
making it an intrasovereign violation. Ne-
vertheless, the Court held that "the Jams 
balance between costs and benefits comes 
out against applying the exclusionary rule 
in civil deportation hearings held by the 
INS." Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050, 
104 S.Ct. at 3489, 82 L.Ed.2d at 793. It 
was observed that the INS had "already 
taken sensible and reasonable steps to de-
ter Fourth Amendment violations by its 
officers," making the likely additional de-
terrent value of the exclusionary rule 
srna)). Id "The costs of applying the 
exclusionary rule in the context of civil 
deportation hearings are high," the Court 
noted, because the courts would be com-
pelled to release from custody persons who 
would then immediately resume their com-
mission of a crime through their continuing 
unlawful presence in this country. Id 
In a case decided after Janis, the Second 
Circuit held in Tirado v. Commissioner, 
689 F.2d 307 (2d Cir.1982), that evidence 
allegedly seized unlawfully by federal nar-
cotics agents for use in a narcotics prosecu-
tion was not barred by the exclusionary 
rule in a subsequent federal civil tax pro-
ceeding by the IRS. The court concluded 
that the deterrent value of the exclusionary 
rule would not be served by applying the 
rule to exclude evidence from a proceeding 
where the evidence was not seized with the 
participation or collusion of, or in contem-
plation of use by, the IRS agents responsi-
ble for the proceeding in which the evi-
dence is presented. Id, at 315. The court 
noted that the exclusionary rule "is calcu-
lated to prevent, not to repair," and that it 
should not be applied in cases where there 
is only a remote prospect of deterrence. 
Id at 310 (citing Elkins v. United States, 
364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S.Ct 1437, 1444, 4 
20 Utah 841 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
L.E&2d 1669 (I960)). "Since use of the 
exclusionary rule impairs the search for 
truth even as it aids observance of constitu-
te rial limitations, standards for use of the 
rule must balance public needs against the 
claims of individual liberty." Id. at 310. 
In refusing to apply the exclusionary rule 
in the tax deficiency proceedings brought 
against the defendant by the IRS, the court 
stated that the deterrent purpose of the 
rule would not be served by suppressing 
the seized evidence that formed the basis 
of the tax deficiency notice. Said the 
court: 
Tax deficiency proceedings are too re-
mote from the "zone of primary interest" 
of the narcotics agents who made the 
seizures in Tirado's apartment. As in 
Janis, it is not reasonable to suppose 
that a rule barring use of the evidence in 
a civil tax proceeding would have materi-
ally influenced those agents in their deci-
sion whether to make the particular sei-
zures Nor would agents of the 
Drug Enforcement Agency be likely to 
harbor a general motivating interest in 
assisting the enforcement of civil tax ob-
ligations. 
Id. at 314. 
As is pointed out in footnote 1 in the 
majority opinion, Sims was charged with 
the crime of possession of a controlled sub-
stance with intent to distribute for value. 
The trial court convicted him, but the court 
of appeals overturned that conviction after 
determining that evidence of the drugs 
seized from his automobile should have 
been suppressed. State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 
141 (Utah Ct.App.1991). Thus, a healthy 
dose of deterrent has already been adminis-
tered to the officers participating in the 
roadblock. To administer a further dose to 
the Tax Commission is quite unfounded. 
The Tax Commission is charged by the 
Utah Constitution with administering the 
tax laws of this state. Neither the Com-
mission nor any of its officers or employees 
originated or participated in any way in the 
roadblock. Application of the exclusionary 
rule in this case will not serve any deter-
1. Subsequently, the Iowa legislature enacted a 
statute that extended the exclusionary rule to 
driver's license revocation proceedings. See 
rent purpose since the Commission, its of fi-
cers, and its employees are blameless in 
any violation there may have been of Sims' 
constitutional rights. Like the officers 
who illegally seized evidence in Janis, in 
Lopez-Mendoza, and in Tirado, the offi-
cers here, who were members of the Juab 
County Sheriffs force and members of the 
Utah Highway Patrol, did not have in mind 
aiding or assisting the Tax Commission in 
collecting taxes when they set up the road-
block which resulted in Sims' apprehension. 
That thought was not in their "zone of 
primary interests." Unless the exclusion-
ary rule under our state constitution is to 
be applied blindly in every case where 
there is a violation, it has no place in the 
instant case, where no deterrent effect will 
be felt. 
Recently the Supreme Court of Iowa, in 
Westendorfv. Iowa Department of Trans-
portation, 400 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa 1987), 
refused to impose the exclusionary rule in 
a driver's license revocation proceeding be-
cause it "would have little force as a deter-
rent of unlawful police action because the 
[driver's license] department does not con-
trol the actions of local police officers." 
Id. at 557. That court, relying upon the 
Supreme Court's decisions in Janis and in 
Lopez-Mendoza, applied a balancing test.1 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Jer-
sey, in Delguidice v. New Jersey Raxing 
Commission, 100 NJ. 79, 494 A.2d 1007 
(1985), held that a finding of entrapment 
and the resulting dismissal of criminal pro-
ceedings against a jockey did not prevent 
use of the incriminating evidence in the 
jockey's licensing hearing before the racing 
commission. The balancing test of Janis 
and Lopez-Mendoza was employed. Be-
cause the illegally obtained evidence had 
been suppressed in the criminal proceed-
ings, the desired deterrent had already 
been realized, and extending the exclusion-
ary sanction to the subsequent licensing 
proceeding would have no deterrent effect 
There are significant parallels in the 
Iowa case, the New Jersey case, and the 
Brownsberger v. Department of Transp., Motor 
Vehicle Div., 460 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1990). 
STATE •. PETERSON Utah 21 
CtU»s*41 Md 21 (UUhApp. 1992) 
First, in all three cases, the were a constitutional right and completely instant case, 
subsequent civil proceedings arose out of 
the same incidents as the criminal proceed-
ings. In the criminal proceedings, the evi-
dence was suppressed. Second, in the sub-
sequent civil proceedings, the defendants 
were faced with heavy consequences. 
Sims faces a substantial tax and penalty. 
In the Iowa case, the defendant faced the 
loss of his driver's license, which usually is 
a more severe consequence than a short jail 
term or a fine imposed for driving under 
the influence. In the New Jersey case, the 
jockey faced the loss of his license that 
enabled him to earn his living. In all three 
cases, the tax commission, the driver's li-
cense department, and the racing commis-
sion, respectively, did not direct, authorize, 
or in any way control the officers' actions. 
Consequently, application of the exclusion-
ary rule in the civil proceeding would serve 
Ho purpose. 
The majority opinion does not conduct 
any kind of a balancing test to determine 
Whether application of the exclusionary 
rule is appropriate in this case. No men-
tion is even made of the high cost of invok-
ing the rule, viz., Sims escapes criminal 
conviction and all tax and penalties. In-
deed, the only justification offered is that 
law enforcement entities have a "financial 
motivation" for conducting illegal searches 
since Utah law provides that resulting rev-
enue will be shared with the agency con-
ducting the search. Utah Code Ann. § 5 9 -
19-105(6). However, the majority concedes 
that this provision did not become effective-
Until nine months after the search of Sims' 
automobile. Therefore, it is clear that in 
the instant case, no part of the tax or 
Penalty imposed on Sims will find its way 
hack to Juab County, where the roadblock 
occurred. The officers here did not act 
under any financial incentive. 
In summary, the majority, in applying 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitu-
tion, goes further than any case of the 
United States Supreme Court in enforcing 
Fourth Amendment rights. The majority 
Pushes the exclusionary rule into the area 
°f civil tax law, where few courts, if any, 
federal or state, have ever trod. The ma-
jority applies the exclusionary rule as if it 
overlooks the deterrent effect of the exclu-
sionary rule in the overturning of Sims' 
criminal conviction. Applying the rule 
against the Tax Commission will serve no 
deterrent purpose. 
I would affirm the decision of the Com-
mission. 
HALL, CJ., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of HOWE, Associate CJ. 
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Defendant was convicted in the Fourth 
District Court, Utah County, Ray M. Har-
ding, J., of distributing or arranging to 
distribute cocaine. Defendant appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held that 
(1) .findings regarding wiretap order ade-
quately supported denial of suppression 
motion, even though findings did not spe-
cifically address each objection by defen-
dant; (2) interception of defendant's tele-
phone conversations complied with wiretap 
order; and (3) evidence supported convic-
tion. 
Affirmed. 
1. Telecommunications «=»514 
County attorney's documents specifi-
cally authorizing deputy county attorney to 
apply for wiretap order satisfied federal 
statute authorizing principal prosecuting 
attorney of political subdivision to apply 
